Haiti Working Group
United States Institute Of Peace
April 25, 2006
Building a democratically structured State: challenges for the next administration
by Hyppolite Pierre
Foreword
Two words that can most appropriately describe Haiti since the fall of Duvalier in 1986 are instability, and disorganization. This is more the result of the whole political class' focus on power for its own sake rather than as a force to help transform society for the better.
The challenges for Haiti are enormous yet, winnable. At the same time the mere recognition, that there are indeed challenges to overcome, is a success. The next successful step will come about when the parties, that can and will make Haiti a livable place, take an inventory of the most crucial challenges. Such inventory will in turn help focus on useful and efficient strategies to develop means to transform Haiti into a nation where citizenry means more than one's social connection or political affiliation.
Haiti is a challenge, for Haitians, for the country's friends and detractors, for the international community, and for everyone who has set foot on this small yet fascinating place. Probably because of the circumstances under which it became independent, Haiti has always been more than its mere perimeter of nearly 28,000 square kilometers. It is a land of hope and pride, of sorrow and languor. It is a place of contrast, a place where brilliance and stupidity may sit at the same table while looking at and hearing each other, without ever watching and listening to each other. It is a place where watching has become synonymous with voyeurism, and where dialogue is a mere monologue.
Haitians have always had an attitude that many qualify as eccentric because it usually borders either a derogatory or an overconfident sense of the self, individual and collective. Even (some might rather say, especially) among themselves, Haitians tend to be either for or against something. It is a Manichean place, one where the most reasonable person from a reasonable environment may suddenly become embroiled in, and enamored with the most unreasonable attitude and set of rules.
Haiti is a place of excitement. It is a place where one finds sightless light where there only need to be brightness; and scary darkness where just some clouds roam through the sky. In either situation, one can never see because there is always too much light or too much darkness. How then, to contrast the glaring visual and project enough darkness right into this lighted projectile so day and night are never instruments for blindness? To put it bluntly and simply, how does one make Haiti work for each and everyone?
The Haiti of the past
(A quick historical background)
One of the easiest and probably most accurate ways to describe Haiti historically would be to refer to the perpetual fight for political power. In the process, Haiti has let go of numerous opportunities from the time it gained independence until now.
Christophe and Pétion plotted successfully to kill Dessalines in 1806, the leader of the independence. Shortly thereafter they fought against each other, with Christophe wanting to have full and unchecked control and power over the affairs of the State. Realizing that they could not outdo each other, they divided the country into two parts with each one governing their own territory within the restricted confinement of the land. After Pétion's death in 1818 of yellow fever, his lieutenant Jean-Pierre Boyer became president of the Republic while Christophe was still governing the North as King. Christophe, having realized by then that it is best for the country to be one whole rather than two separate parts, proposed to Boyer a reunification plan which the latter rejected.
After Christophe's suicide in 1820, the country was reunited under the command of Boyer. Haiti was even expanded when Boyer took over the Eastern side of the island making present day Dominican Republic an integral part of Haiti. Boyer thus governed over the whole island of Hispaniola for more than 20 years (1818-1843). He so mismanaged the Eastern side, transforming higher education institution into military barrack, that Dominicans today claim that Haitians have caused them to be behind, by at least a century, for having governed them.
So there it is. These are the precedents. From the beginning, we had two crucial problems: love of power in exclusivist form; and a sense of and for political expediency that results in gross and institutionalized mismanagement of State affairs. The whole history of Haiti revolves around these themes.
On the other hand, the few and far moments in history where brilliant politicians with a plan and platform had the opportunity to directly help transform society for the better, they reverted to self-defeating actions that destroyed their party and weakened the State. The very famous founder of the Parti Libéral Jean-Pierre Boyer Bazelais, went to war against the government of Salomon in Miragoane obviously for political gain1, and was defeated. As a result, his party suffered a severe setback which it never recovered from. President Salomon, rather than choosing or suggesting a successor in 1886 to carry the policy torch of the Parti National as the nation's leader, decided instead to twist the arms of members of Parliament so they could reelect him to power. Two years later in 1888, he was forced out of power, went to exile in France where he died a few months later. The party that he helped found (the National Party) never recovered from this mishap. Incidentally, these are the two best known and most debated political parties in Haiti's history.2
The repetitious effect of political expediency, violence, and mismanagement through the first half of Haiti's history had justified the first occupation in 1915. Yet, Haitians had not learned much from that experience. We would resume politics by 1934, following the US Occupation, the same way that we did a century earlier.
François Duvalier became president in 1957, ran the country with an iron fist, as if it was his personal fiefdom. Finally in February 1986, his son was forced to leave the country and went to France into exile. Haiti has yet to recover from this experience. Since then, two political forces with many different variances are at play: the traditionalists and the modernists.
Struggling for Modernity: The Modernists and the Traditionalists
The current system at work
Most contemporary political analysts who follow Haitian politics tend to argue along a defaulting line. Unbeknownst to them, they are trapped in a political culture that has been designed over time as one that favors autocracy, corruption, and unproductive laissez-faire values. To put it simply, it is a country that is by design structurally mismanaged by design. Yet, to truly comprehend the new dynamism that is taking place, Haiti needs to first focus on two very important issues: the irreversible effect of the democratic process, and the slow but certain death of the old system of government.
If for the past 20 years one political segment has dominated the political system in Haiti, it is simply because of an unnoticed but extremely important event that occurred on December 16, 1990. On that day, the vast majority of the electorate went to the voting booth and elected a president with a Parliament. By most accounts, these elections were free, fair, and democratic. Regardless of the fact that Aristide was elected president on that day, this was a stark historical contrast with the way power was attained in Haiti up until that day.
Previously and throughout Haiti's history, those who became leaders of the nation either had the favor of the army, or of the elite, or of both the army and the elite, or of a powerful segment of either. The perception has also been lately, that Haitian politicians consult first with foreign embassies and governments when and if they wish to become political leaders. They do not seem concerned to first gain the trust of the electorate.
Prior to 1990, the vast majority of the Haitian people were basically on the sideline, letting the gwo zotobre (the powerful) playing the game that they know best: politics. They were only consulted as a fifth column, which was used and reused, only to be discarded once the true players found better ways to resolve their own issue.
In December 1990, for the first time in Haitian history the poor, the middle class, and the rich were using the same pen under the same tent to write the names of leaders whom they wanted to govern the nation for a specifically allotted constitutional time. This was a very different framework. As it is said in Haitian, zombi goute sèl, li pa mande sispann. In other words, once the vast majority of the electorate tasted the salt of democracy, they have not and will not let go. They're there for good.
This is what was so surprising to most when again, on February 7, 2006, so many Haitians went to the polls and voted in large majority for a candidate of the left, whom everyone presumed just a few months earlier had retired from politics. But Haitian politicians are masters of deceit and Préval deceived them. Those well-versed in Haitian political thought did, rightfully as it turned out, suspect that Préval would run. So he did and even won.
That victory of René Préval was not a victory for Aristide, as the latter wrongly concluded. It was and is a cry for reform, a cry for fundamental changes in the political and cultural system. In fact and in truth, many people who absolutely despise Aristide voted for Préval. Aristide is part of the traditional way of doing politics in Haiti whereas Préval may, just may, represent something different.
As we proceed with this debate, something needs to be clear as well. The problem, for certain segments of the left when Aristide is debated in a nonpartisan way, may lie in the fact that initially and for just cause, he enjoyed unprecedented support even among certain elements of the right. Nevertheless, for Haiti to move forward and become a rational society, no leader should be shielded from constructive criticism. After all, this is what made it possible for François Duvalier to have become the nightmarish leader of Haiti.
Although Estimé was by-and-large a very decent political leader, he made the tragic mistake in 1950 of trying to amend if not change the constitution just so he could be reelected. When Magloire overthrew him shortly thereafter, the discussion reverted to that particular exaction instead of the initial attempt by Estimé of a misdeed, not in any way condoning Magloire's coup. The historical fact is that basic constitutional principle of law was also about to be violated by Estimé for potentially autocratic purpose.
The same way, when for instance on the Corbett list3, between 2001 and early 2004, Aristide was being accused by opponents of corruption, many conscious partisans asked and even demanded that the government come clean and refute those accusations with facts and documents. He never did, nor did his deputies. In fact, those who asked for such reply were either given the cold shoulder or simply ignored.
As for the victory of Préval, many voters who cast their ballot for him in 2006 assume, based on their experience with him as Haiti's leader between 1996 and 2001, that he does not represent the old system. Préval indeed does not seem to fit the traditionalist mode. As proof, while other politicians were trying to position themselves by toasting champagne in fancy glasses and sipping Barbancourt rum at embassies or in many fine Port-au-Prince salons, Préval was way up in the North, in his hometown of Marmelade, working with peasants on small projects. He is also the one who during his first presidency, was chastised by Haitians in general for having stated that "we ought to swim if we want to reach ashore" (fók nou naje pou n sóti).
The last time around that Préval was president, he had one important and valuable argument or pretext: he was overshadowed by Aristide. This time around, he may not and should not have this argument or pretext. It is indeed true that Haitians have to deal with their own problems, with logistical support from the international community when necessary, rather than waiting as toddlers for the international community to clothe them with pampers. Thus, the Préval analogy of fók nou naje pou n sóti (we ought to swim if we want to wish ashore) is very important.
It would not be prudent either to give Préval too much credit, as he is preparing for a 5-year term which will end in 2011. After all, Haitian politicians are deceitful by the very nature of the political system. The traditional way of doing politics has not ended yet, and will not end just because the leader of the executive branch is or is perceived to be more modernist than others. There are as there would always be, many traditionalists who are surrounding and will continue to surround him throughout his presidency, as there are modernists.
The Traditionalists
The traditionalists do have a vision of power. They represent the old left and the old right, and they also tend to believe that power is a sacred right. They are largely from two categories.
The traditionalists who tend to be from lower and middle class status are usually from urban areas, from the majority, and are masters of populist discourse to ensnare the masses and have them fall into their traps. For much of Haiti's history they would debate and discuss issues, say the right things, attack the elite in all sorts of ways and with all sorts of discourse, while befriending elements in the military to help them overthrow a regime that did not or would not pass on favors. If or once they would become political leaders, they would join the rank of the classic traditionalists and behave exactly the same way as those who only days or months or years earlier they decried as evil.
Since the first democratic elections in 1990, the traditionalists from lower and middle class have not changed. If anything, they have become much more entrenched in populist discourse hoping to attract (and sometimes even succeed at attracting) enough votes to get elected in a variety of offices.
Indeed, however frustrating and cliché this may sound, Aristide falls in the category of traditionalists if one follows closely his political path. One of the few reasons why he never fully became one of them is because he was never completely accepted by them. He was never forgiven for his prior discourses by the classic and upper class traditionalists, and many among the lower and middle class, urban traditionalists despise him.
Although there were many modernists who truly believed that Aristide in 2004 was dangerously slipping into autocracy and had become aberrant, thereby justifying his removal, the most vociferous elements against him were all traditionalists. As usual, the proof of such came after Aristide was forced out of power. If for the upper class traditionalists, Aristide was too daring and showed too much bravado, for the lower and middle income traditionalists, it was a case of when will it be my turn(?) (kilè m a fè yon kou tou?).
The upper class traditionalists are almost never interested in direct involvement in politics. Instead they prefer governing by understudies, assuring that the system is corrupt enough so they will have to pay very little if any taxes. They also fight off competition in the private sector by using their political influence, and have remained amorphous to the plight of the country as a whole. They tend to exhibit a great level of social confidence based on class selfishness and class consciousness, and prefer living an exclusive lifestyle that has very little connection to the material and cultural reality of Haiti. They favor the old system as is, the old corrupt structure, rightfully concluding that the more open and democratic the country becomes, the less unwarranted privilege they will enjoy. Therefore, this is not necessarily conservative philosophy in the classic and modern sense of the term. Rather, it is a form of conservatism, a keeping-it-all for themselves formula that even borders on racism to the untrained eye. However, as many of them are of a lighter shade, and as pointed out by Rolph-Trouillot in some of his writings, they also pride themselves in having this or that family member who is black, as they know that they can use such argument against potential accusation of racism. At the same time, they are fierce and ruthless when comes time to defend their own turf, their own interests, as politicians have learned over the years.
The traditionalists, of all political persuasions, were also the most virulent proponents of overthrowing Aristide in 1991 and 2004. They feared that their interests would be jeopardized. Indeed, even though Aristide was himself a traditionalist politician, he brought into the political arena a group of politicians that could have caused the old system to collapse in the long term, which was not necessarily for the better. If the urban and lower class traditionalists were more concerned with power, the classic and wealthier traditionalists were and are more concerned about maintaining their privilege. Fortunately, all of Haiti's traditionalists do want democracy. Unfortunately it is of a corrupt kind, the kind that causes so much disparity that, overtime it breeds vile populism that becomes detrimental to a healthy system of government and the country's economy and long-term stability and viability. It also produces the kind of environment where elitism prevails and produces a kind of government where political opponents are arrested under the pretext of public clamor4 (again, a populism of a different sort), or genocide5 (a dangerous use of a term with significant legal and moral ramifications).
Haiti on the other hand, can choose to structure its system of government so it becomes a modern democracy, run by a competent and intelligent cadre of leaders and administrators, with power shared in a distributive form that is conducive to genuine progress: economic, social, and cultural.
The Modernists
The modernists are also of the left and the right. They could be easily characterized as center-left and center right. It is usually clear as to which political and economic philosophy they adhere to. They are neither overtly elitists nor populists and tend to analyze issues based on facts, even when they inject in their analysis their ideological slant. They are easily approachable and, when overwhelmed by the facts, they will concede even to the short-term detriment of their own ideological kin. The modernists tend to be much more pragmatic, unattached to any particular Haitian political party in or out of Haiti, and can be found among all segments of Haitian society within and outside the country.
Less passionate over political leaders or parties, they are not usually the voices heard in debates and discussions about Haiti, for either side of the traditional left and right tend to shut them out as voices of confusion, as "possible CIA agents".
By virtue of their pragmatism and reasonableness, they are probably best suited to help restructure Haiti, for they are not trusted by the traditional elements involved in the political process. Their hands are freer to make the kinds of decisions for the reforming and structuring of the State to benefit the nation as a whole.
Dismantling the Old System
The struggle for a stable, progressive, and democratic Haiti appears to be at best a difficult, if not an impossible dream. It seems so mostly because the hard work of structurally organizing the government effectively is exceedingly boring.
Haitians have developed over two centuries a taste for politics as an exclusive and dramatic (and soap-opera like) art form. In the process, the best analogy for Haitian politics has become that of someone hitting so hard on his gas pedal that his car wheels spin and never get out of the mud. Fortunately, for people who know and understand how the current and defective system works, the actual enterprise of reforming the State is already half-way done. The other half is in committing the parties to actually do the work of thinking through how to best reform the system so the country finally works. Here are some potential procedures.
Parliament and its Role
The first task is to decide which branch of the primary system of government is the actual center of power. Traditionally, Haiti's executive branch is the center. That in turn has favored both autocratic régimes and populist forms of governments, from the right and the left. In reality, the center of power needs to be the legislative branch.
The proposal to reform the system for a stronger legislature can be easily traced back in time. The movement began in our political history, with a brilliant Haitian politician from the right, a founder of the Parti Libéral Jean-Pierre Boyer Bazelais, who himself was influenced by the Whigs (the British Labour Party). He envisioned a Haiti where the legislature would play a greater role in a better structured government6.
This makes sense because, not only is the legislature a body that represents localities and departments (respectively the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate), but also different political parties and affiliations. As such, the legislature encompasses a wide array of individuals with different thoughts and backgrounds. As such and under the best set of circumstances, when a decision is made, it represents to varying degrees rules agreed upon by a majority of voices by people from divergent opinions and groups. It is also the best place for a well-defined system of checks and balances, forcing the executive and all other branches of government to give account to, and explanations of, their decisions.
To be the vital center of the political system, the legislature also ought to function not just in public forum but also and perhaps most importantly in committees, with parliamentarians fulfilling roles of overseers based on their individual specialties. In that sense an experienced deputy or senator, whose background is legal, is more able to understand the rules and question a potential judge of the highest or lower court. The same goes for a Member of Parliament who is a medical doctor by trade, and holds membership in a legislative committee that focuses on medical issues, or for an agronomist who participates in a senatorial committee that oversees the Department of Agriculture.
The indications are that the next Parliament will have no single party with an overwhelming majority that will allow either side to pass through one-sided decisions, good or bad. This is very fortunate, considering that there are also works, for the upcoming 48th Parliament, which are vital in the context of reforming the State to make it structurally sturdier and more democratic. In the best of worlds the parties at play in the 48th legislature will be able to form two large blocs, based on ideological affinities, with even perhaps a healthy crowd of parliamentarian dissenters, unattached to these two blocs. It will then be a healthier crossover, thereby facilitating the process of reforming the system, assuming that the elected legislators of the 48th legislature do not behave as destructively as did the 46th.
The necessary reforms, whether they come from executive or legislative proposals, will be reviewed and thought out by the legislators. Hopefully relevant interest groups will have enough structured and codified access7 to the system whereby they'll be able to make their own suggestions before final passage or rejections of proposals into law.
The role of Parliament is to definitely add bones to the flesh of this struggling democratic system. This is not only important but vital, necessary. The Haitian Parliament ought to play the role of an intelligent arbiter, a sort of buffer between the traditionally predatory executive and all other branches of government, primary and secondary8.
The Executive
The executive branch needs not to be restricted, but better thought out so it ceases to be a continual predator. The focus has always been so much on the executive throughout history that it has always been, either difficult for leaders to do their job, or easy for them to steal and basically maim the state. The traditional role of the Executive has been that of the unhealthy, cancerous governmental center of the whole political system.
Again, this is a system that is crying out for reforms. The Haitian executive has mostly produced and attracted actual and would-be autocrats and populists the result by its very design. One could safely say that elected president René Préval is already grappling with this reality, considering that all segments of society are focused on him as not just the center, but the personification of the entire system. It is a very paternalistic system, one where the president is expected to play the classic role of a Papa Bon Coeur (Father Good-Heart). In other words, the expectation by the general population makes the role of the president to be that of an autocrat.
As truth lies first and foremost in the facts, no one should be surprised at the fact that for the last round of elections on February 7, 2006, the percentage of the population that went to the polls was higher than 60 percent of the registered electorate. For the second round of elections however, which took place on April 21, 2006, because the presidency had already been decided, the percentage of registered voters who went to the polls was discernibly lower.
This shows that not only is the presidency too powerful by tradition (thereby impeding upon the process of better power distribution) but most importantly, that the nation as a whole has come to place too much faith in an institution in which power ought to be paradoxically limited so it can be more effective. This also implies that those who voted for Préval may harbor unreasonable expectations, while some among those who disagree with his philosophy of government are already setting things up (at least in their minds), so they can ensure not only his failure but most importantly, his overthrow.
Indeed, if one trusts messages that are posted on the worldwide web, there is already a chorus of traditionalists who are suggesting that they will manage to overthrow him if he does not begin to deliver within the first 6 months of his presidency. In other words, both sides see the future of Haiti through the very narrow prism of an autocratic, if not despotic, presidency. The presidency, and therefore the executive branch of government as a whole, has to be freed up from these sorts of expectations if only to ensure the stability of a reformed system.
How About the Judiciary?
It is clear that Haiti does not have a functioning judicial system that is fair and trustworthy. This is not due to lack of money; it is rather the result of a lack of will. Financial institutions like the World Bank, have invested to no avail millions over the years, especially since 1994, trying to help create a viable judicial branch. It has not worked, essentially because the executive branch has always had overwhelming and unchecked influence on the system. Both the traditional left and right have abused the Judiciary in recent years, and the failure of the judicial system is typified by these recent stories.
Aristide's pressures, on former president Ertha Trouillot shortly after his accession to the presidency in 1991, were only curbed by the insistence of the international community to let resign. She was accused of plotting along with the late coup-monger Roger Lafontant. In fact, she could and probably would have been imprisoned under legal pretexts, had the international community not interfered on her behalf.
It is based on that same logic that Aristide managed to keep former president and military commander Prosper Avril behind prison bars, even after a judge acquitted the latter of the original charges which he was imprisoned under.
In the same way, because the executive branch has too much power and too few codified limitations that have allowed the Latortue government to keep Neptune, Privert, and others behind bars. The reasons are clearly political, although they cite logistical difficultites for their continuing imprisonment. It is an unfair judicial system, especially for the poor and uneducated, which needs to be empowered if only to play its important and independent role in the democratic game.
It is clear however that despite all pretexts given, had the preceding and current governments of Haiti had the political will, they could have created a venue, right inside the very prison system whereby judges could set up rotating tribunals to quickly resolve such cases. They would thereby liquidate the system of petty cases, free up individuals who should or could have been free by now, and thereby begin the process of building a system where legal issues of greater importance and ramifications could actually be adjudicated in formal tribunals. The political will is not there because the judicial branch is corrupt and over politicized.
One should hope that the next Préval administration will not get involved in those sorts of judicial shenanigans, as he must work with other branches of government towards reforming the Judiciary, and also help establish and maintain the genuine independence that the Judiciary requires. Once more, the Parliament's role in making sure that such independence is acquired and maintained is essential. The Judiciary must be impartial to be effective, and for that to happen there needs to be lots of qualitative and quantitative work. Finally, there also needs to be a commitment by all branches of government to respect and adhere to the 1987 Constitution, even though it too needs to be reformed.
There is every indication that most Haitian politicians, had they had the opportunity, would have by now amended the 1987 Cconstitution but also revamp it in a way that would have given it a new face and soul just to fit their political goal. This has not happened thus far because of many different reasons. The primary reason nevertheless, is the fact that the '87 Constitution was voted via a referendum by a majority. This has made it extremely difficult, for either side to commit the kind of treachery that they would like to and legally condone it.
There needs to be greater commitment to that constitution for many different reasons. Besides the fact that it is a good document, it is also the first that has begun to truly demonstrate for Haitians the substantially positive value of a democratic system. Moreover, a country cannot and should not change constitutions at the whim of partisan political moments. This impedes upon the judicial process, forces lawyers and judges to reject, learn, and relearn legal values that were in place only months or years before. Good lawyers, effective and experienced judges, and especially constitutional experts cannot be trained or acquired if a country's constitution is continually revamped, reshuffled, replaced for opportunistic, political reasons. This is where tradition counts and is not just important but vital.
State Institutions
The State institutions have to be reformed in a way that is as nonpartisan as possible. Again, because Parliament is an assembly where many different ideological opinions will converge and be tested, national legislators will have to play a major role in such reform.
Those who run State institutions must be qualified enough, yet enjoy a degree of independence from the executive branch that they can offer assessments that are as devoid of political overtone or undertone as possible.
The State institutions will have to be better regulated and overseen, by Parliament instead of the Executive, with competent people who acquire their job not simply because of political connections or affiliation but mostly because of their expertise. After all, State institutions are the bedrock of any truly efficient and effective political system. This doesn't mean that the executive branch may not or will not have to play a role in the process. It simply means that the criteria have to be well-defined in a body of rules and regulations, so traditionalists cannot continue on using those institutions for their own individualistic or clan-based gain by placing people in strategic positions so they can better rip off the system. This goes not just for institutions like the Taxation office (the DGI) or the Department of Agriculture but also institutions like the media.
As for example, the TNH (Télévision Nationale d'Haïti) and the RNH (Radio Nationale d'Haïti) have basically been the mouthpiece of successive governments since their inception during Baby Doc's years in the late 1970's. As such they are not trusted, or are only trusted by those segments of the population that agree with a particular government's philosophy or policies. To instill the general population's trust and confidence in the information they divulge and programs they promote, the News division of both TNH and RNH must be comprised of trusted and qualified journalists and administrators from a variety of political opinions and/or connections. That way, the news programs may be more balanced if all sides of the journalistic body for instance are represented and governed by consensual formula that may ensure the veracity of the news. Haitian journalists, especially at the State level, since the State must set the right example, have to learn to deal with facts rather than abide by usual practice of what is called in the local language, voye monte9.
Haitians may even have to ask for the expert help of experienced and credible international news organizations such as the BBC, NPR, or CBC if only to learn how to improve their journalistic skills, from gathering the news to delivering it and analyzing it. Thereby, if people can trust the news divulged by the State media, if different editors from different ideological points of view are allowed and even encouraged to convey their opinion of the facts, it will be easier for the State to use these media outlets to run development incentive programs. The larger population, by-and-large, will trust the TNH and the RNH because the news and analyses they convey are from different journalistic and ideological standpoints. However, so long as the news is perceived to be biased and gives unfair advantage to the executive branch of government, most if not all other programs for development sponsored by government will lack broad-based credibility.
This is important because government, for all the work that it has to do, needs to earn the systemic trust of the general population. Otherwise any and every program will be viewed and perceived by the larger population as simple propaganda.
The Diaspora
This is again, a very tough and difficult issue. Haitians who live abroad (the Diaspora) thus far, have not had the kind of positive effect they should have and need to have. Yet, it is Haiti's largest asset in terms of human and financial resources. The human resources of the Diaspora have never been evaluated and apportioned so specialties can be determined to help the country move forward. Even worse, many people in Haiti think of the Diaspora largely as the causes of all the ills in society. After all, most of the prominent post-Duvalier politicians have either lived outside of Haiti prior to his overthrow, or have some kind of Diaspora connection. The Diaspora is also regarded as an unfair competitor who jumps onto a defective system for personal, individualistic gain.
Nevertheless, the hard work of structuring the State for a better run and more democracy requires the effective, systemic, studied, and tested inclusion of the Diaspora in the process. Again, this cannot be done on a partisan basis. The Diaspora elements who enter the system of government, especially in the State institutions, have to be qualified, not because they are partisans of a régime but rather, because their curriculum vitae and personal history had been verified as comprising the kind of expertise and honesty that they claim, and which are necessary – because they have the necessary skills to do the job.
If the Diaspora are not included in the developmental process in a more systemic fashion, chances are that they will just continue to be or perceived to be as an additional impediment to the country. The perceived tendency indeed, for many Diaspora elements (especially among the most successful), seems to have been lately to use their newly acquired wealth to befriend traditionalists and become like them. If only in that sense, popular belief and discomfort with the Diaspora is at least partly justified.
Fighting Corruption
However one decides to design the democratic system of government in Haiti, all work done may be irrelevant if corruption is not at the very least severely curtailed, and under the best set of circumstances completely eradicated. There are some difficult decisions that government as a whole (judiciary, parliamentary, and executive) may have to make. That way, they will enable the CSCCA10 to be much more effective. Those legally established rules may include:
- Better structure and refine the CSCCA, the body that focuses on corruption, to make sure that they can investigate corruption at all levels and forward the culprits to the established and relevant judicial venues. By doing so they would make government less attractive to potential predators.
- Enabling the CSCCA to intrude in the personal finances of public officials, if and when they have reasonable justification to do so.
- Allow the CSCCA to establish rules, laws, and regulations that either limit the percentage of savings a public servant can hold in foreign accounts or investments; or even allow the CSCCA to completely disallow politicians or public servants in general to hold foreign accounts once they work for the public domain.
- Better accounting of public officials' wealth, including the right to dig into and analyzing their personal holding prior to and after having been public officials.
- Taking into account the past history of a potential State employee if that person had previously worked in the private sector. Indeed, one of the dirty secrets of Haiti is the fact that the private sector has been corrupted by individual employees as the public sector is reputed to be. Haiti is a morally diseased country at its core, and will be even more difficult to implement.
A Caveat on the Issue of Fighting Corruption
The process and actuality of fighting corruption is not an easy one. Society is indeed so systemically corrupt that not only will it take time but patience and tact. Government as a whole will have to work with all sectors in terms of how to best proceed, so everyone has a say in implementing whichever rules that will be adopted. Trying to eliminate corruption in just one fell swoop may backfire, unless the mechanisms are known and understood by those who have most benefited from it and propone it as well. There will have to be reasonable incentives given to those who practice it, while the CSCCA argues effectively the short and long term detrimental effects of corruption on those who practice it, those who condone it, society at large, and the very survival of the country's long term prosperity or potential of such.
If governmental organs such as Parliament, the Executive, or the CSCCA itself decide to crack down on corruption without for instance, using a "phasing out" process of the least egregious practices, the backlash may bring more instability than can even be anticipated. One has to understand that the political and economic system of Haiti has been so corrupted over the years, that there are practices which are considered by all sides as "normal". They have become so ingrained in society that they now represent cultural flaws. This is a very tall challenge.
One thing that is for sure, though, is that the State will have to make some very difficult decisions for the nation as a whole on that issue. If for example, Haiti State institutions must be run through meritocracy for greater effectiveness, the better minds will have to be salaried appropriately. Otherwise, those experts and technocrats will be more corruptible. The State being the largest employer in Haiti and the private sector having very little incentive to invest, a devoted, talented, and well-qualified employee whose remuneration does not match may only have two bad options. The first option may be to leave the country and therefore, a loss of an important human resource; the second one may be to stay but to also use his or her influence in government to increase his salary by illegal means.
If in the United States, a public servant's salary may be well below that of an individual doing the same work in the private sector, in a country like Haiti, the reverse needs to be true, at least in the short and mid terms. After all, in a country like the US, people go to work in the public sector, assured of livable middle class wages, just so they can find better jobs in the long term in private industry. In Haiti, such an option does not even exist yet.
The truth of the matter remains, that unless government is not only better conceived but also better regulated to combat corruption, Haiti is doomed. The international community will have to continue on bailing out Haitians. Politicians from the traditional right and left will continue to argue over pittance. The majority of the population will continue to suffer. The system itself, however well it may be designed, will collapse by its own weight.
Corruption, in any system of government, is probably the deadliest cancer of all. The better a nation protects itself against corruption, the luckier it is, and the easier it gets to develop. Politicians from poorer countries do not in general see the correlation between corruption and the poverty index. Yet, the correlation is clear if only by considering the result.
Any chart that one looks at and which displays results of studies on kleptocratic governments, shows the nasty correlation between corruption, poverty, and underdevelopment index. Nations that are otherwise rich in human and natural resources are behind and stay behind because of the effect of corruption. However well-designed and democratic the system is, corruption may and does eat it from the inside over time. One result may be the rise of populist régimes that function under the disguise of democracy. The other may be the flight of not just capital (human and financial), but also the disappearance of confidence. Such societies and society inevitably either collapse over time, or weaken to the point where if lucky enough, they have to be reformed again to be more effective and much less corrupt.
This is where Haiti's plight lies. Haiti's plight is not only because of an uneducated population. It is also because of a defective system that is nurtured, kept in place, even after the first democratic elections in 1990 because it facilitates corruption. Unless the very system itself is redesigned to be more efficient, more dependent on expertise rather than partisanship, and more effectively combative against corruption (private and public), the international community will simply keep on coming back to Haiti, with the role of feeding poor black children of the nation that likes to pride itself as the first and only one that was borne out of slavery through a successful slave revolt.
Hyppolite Pierre is author of the recently published "Haiti, Rising Flames from Burning Ashes". The book can be purchased by simply visiting the publisher's webpage, http://www.univpress.com
References
- Antoine, Max A., Louis-Étienne Lysius Salomon jeune, Impr. H. Deschamps, 1968.
- Corbett list (The Haiti), http://www.webster.edu/~corbetre/haiti/library/invitation.htm
- Nicholls, David, From Dessalines to Duvalier Race, Color, and National Independence in Haiti, Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick, New Jersey.
- Pierre-Charles, Gérard, Radiographie d'une Dictature, Éditions Nouvelle Optique
- Pierre, Hyppolite, Haiti, Rising Flames from Burning Ashes, Lanham, MG: University Press of America, 2006.
- Shannon, Magdaline W., Jean Price-Mars, The Haitian Elite and the American Occupation, 1915-1935, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996
- Trouillot, Michel-Rolph, Haiti, State Against Nation: The Origins and Legacy of Duvalierism, New York : Monthly Review Press, c1990.
