Corruption, and the battle for the 2006 presidency (Part 1)
By Hippolite Pierre
If there were doubts at first that corruption is pervasive in the administrative machine of the Haitian Government, they have been evaded in recent months with declaration and investigations that have been becoming increasingly frequent. Late this past summer, Port-au-Prince City Hall was in some sort of implosion with members of that cartel accusing the mayor of corruption. Worse, after a financial audit done by the Cour Supérieure des Comptes et du Contentieux Administratif, it became very clear that Mrs. Pouponneau Duperval' City Hall in Port-au-Prince is either very poor in accounting procedure, or simply corrupt.
This past September 2001, a Haitian Senator Mr. Fourel Célestin, accused Haiti's Prime Minister Mr. Chérestal of corruption. The cause of the accusation was the apparent acquisition by the Prime Minister of a new home for $ USD 1,700,000 in Canapé-Vert, a suburb of Port-au-Prince. Following a two weeks absence from his office because of the accusation, Mr. Chérestal returned to his post on September 19, with Haiti's president Mr. Jean-Bertrand Aristide, right next to him as a show of support. When finally it was confirmed that the house was property of the Haitian government and is the official residence of Haitian current and future Prime Ministers, the damage was already done.
For the past few months or so, Haitian and foreign news media have been printing and telling stories about corruption at high levels in the present government. The reality on the ground in Haiti suggests effectively that corruption is becoming increasingly a major concern of independent observers, and even Lavalas partisans. The stories of abuse of government properties by officials of the government, their unnecessary trips to foreign lands on the back of Haitian tax payers, of brand new utility vehicles being driven by members of the administration, of new mansions purchased or built by these officials are quite alarming.
When transparency becomes essential
It was all along determined that transparency is a key ingredient for progress in a democratic Haiti. In fact, Aristide won his first presidency by making such promise to the Haitian people. By the time he was preparing for returning to power in the year 2000, this issue seemed to have been put on the back burner. What made matters worse is the apparent secrecy with which his administration operates in matters of certain financial dealings.
As an example, it makes perfect sense that a Prime Minister needs a decent and perhaps even an opulent home to live in. The Prime Minister is after all, the second highest Executive Officer of the land. He or she will as such, have to deal with foreign representatives and sometimes, invite them to his official residence, and give them the opportunity to stay at some quarter inside that residence. Thus, from a practical standpoint, it makes perfect sense that the State decides, just as the official residence of the president is the National palace, to own a place that is rather opulent where the Prime Minister resides. Another argument that justifies the need for the acquisition of such a home is the matter of practicality. If for instance the Prime Minister is not from Port-au-Prince, but rather from Jérémie in the Grande-Anse department, where then will s/he live while occupying such an important gubernatorial function? Will the State rent her or him a place to stay in the capital?
What creates the malaise from all sides is not this particular home bought by the State, but rather the fact that no one knew of this until afterwards. Had the circumstances of the deal and the logic behind it been explained beforehand or shortly thereafter, it would not have created such outcry. The poor explanation given by the government in this particular case, is quite telling of the minimal level of transparency that exists in the administration.
Perhaps the government's biggest problem is that of abuse and corruption by administrators, national, and local representatives. The issue is not new at the level of municipalities. During the Préval administration (Feb. 1996-Feb. 2001), the mayor of Delmas, a suburb of Port-au-Prince, was accused more than once by a member of his administration of abusing his office and corruption, to the detriment of his constituents. There was no thorough investigation that would have made it possible for the State to know the causes of such misdeeds, and take the necessary steps to make it at least more difficult for government officials to violate the trust of regular citizens. This week, Haiti's president Jean-Bertrand Aristide made a declaration warning the municipal cartels of actions that could go as far as dismantling them.
Reinforcing the Cour Supérieure des Comptes et du Contentieux Administratif (CSCCA)
The CSCCA is an independent agency that has a constitutional mandate to keep a close eye on all financial matters of public officials and public administration. As the members of this constitutional agency view their mandate, they are not authorized to make decisions regarding public officials involved in fraudulent financial acts. Since they have better access to governmental records, they are able to determine, analyze, and understand the common procedures used by crooks in government. If the GOH (Government of Haiti) is as serious as they claim to be about clean and transparent administration, they should not only encourage more financial audits by CSCCA officials, but also follow their advice as much as necessary, on how to install roadblocks in the way of crooks. Haiti's president should add weight to their balance so their significance can increase in the struggle against corruption. The CSCCA should have the authority as for examples, to require financial review of a department's or a ministry's procedure, if they have reasonable doubt about that department or ministry. They should be habilitated to conduct periodic review of all Departments', municipalities' and Ministries books. They should be able to pinpoint irregularities to the general public that have the marks of corruption.
The 2001 presidential campaign and corruption in Haiti
Lavalas' greatest enemy is itself, or so it seems. Its potential for failure and major losses in any future election lies not in the strength of the opposition, but in these corruption scandals, and this insatiable thirst for power that has always characterized Haitian politics.
When in September this year, Senator Fourel Célestin accused the Prime Minister of being corrupt, many people were shocked. At first, most believed that he was acting out of principle. The tableau however, eventually became more interesting.
If it is not Senator Célestin himself, someone else in the current administration is a presidential candidate. That someone is concerned over the closeness between the president and his current Prime Minister, and has decided to destroy the chances of a potential Jean-Marie Chérestal as future presidential candidate and perhaps president in 2006. That is the only rational explanation for the accusations of corruption leveled against him. Once again, recent history is quite telling.
Aristide's first Prime Minister (P.M.) in 1991was René Préval who later became president, whom he crowned as his "twin brother". If Chérestal's administration succeeds, no other than himself will be in a better position to win the presidential elections in November 2005. This is assuming that Lavalas remains popular. The best to do therefore is to cut him short right from the start by accusing him of being corrupt. That explains all the current imbroglio, from the accusations that he bought the house in Canapé Vert for himself with State funds, to his current difficulties with the Minister of Interior, to the so-called OP (popular organizations), demonstrating against him demanding his resignation. It is now an accepted point of view that individuals from the Lavalas leadership use at times their own OP (popular organizations), part of the overall movement, to advance their own cause.
The problem is, that by attacking the P.M. so vigorously as corrupt, the individual politicians are working not only against the P.M., but also against the overall strength of the Lavalas political party. Nevertheless, in the final analysis, Lavalas must deal with these two issues. The corruption scandals if they continue will hurt Aristide's presidency, weaken his position in the current negotiations, and seriously hurt the entire movement in the long run. This is perhaps why he personally spoke about the problems at the municipalities ran by elected officials from his party throughout the country. If the political strategists of that party do not encourage Parliament to pass laws that will strengthen the Cour Supérieure des Comptes et du Contentieux Administratif, Lavalas may only remain a shadow of its current success and may lose the majority that they enjoy now in future elections.
