Contemporary Haitian Politics (Part 1)
The purpose of this study is to write on recent development in Haiti since the mid 1990's. This text examines Haitian politics since the fall of the February 1986 dictatorial régime of the Duvalier family. We also debate its continued impact on the state of the nation's economy, social structure, and politics. This debate involves among other things the problems of presidential leadership, the development of new legislation, the rule of law, and economic growth. We also very briefly touched on the past 100 years as it pertains to foreign intervention in Haiti (1915-1934), and other factors.
By Hyppolite Pierre
The rain first, then the deluge
It's early February. The year is 1986. Most Haitians are nervous about the prospect. "Maybe he'll go this week", some say. "Don't hold your breath", others reply. After all, the last week of January 1986, reports of Baby Doc Duvalier having fled Haiti's capital for some European country were rampant. So much so that he went on national television following those reports to deny it. He uttered those words in the Haitian language that have since then become famous: "Mwen kampe rèd kou youn koko makak" meaning, I stand as firm and determined as ever to stay on.
Yet on the faithful morning of February 7, 1986, everyone woke up in Haiti and around the world to hear and watch the news: the Duvalier dynasty had finally ended. Pictures of Jean-Claude (Baby Doc) Duvalier with his wife, getting off a luxury European automobile for a yet undisclosed destination, never to return to Haiti, were being watched by Haitians in the Diaspora, and even in Haiti. Phone calls from exiles to relatives living there were coming at a very fast pace. Those exiles and their children were happy to either return home for good or at least, go there for a visit.
There was finally hope. Hope that Haiti would finally get a fresh start. Democracy would flourish. Journalists would no longer be imprisoned or feel insecure in the practice of their trade. Security would not be a concern, since the masses of people who risked their lives to demonstrate against Duvalier, all took the precaution of calling on the army as an ally.
The enemy of the people was clear: it was Duvalier and his rogue army, otherwise known as Tonton Makouts. They chanted against them, and promised to punish them for their misdeeds. In fact, the army at the time was such an ally, that when they formed a new coalition government until a new Constitution could be voted and elections be held, there were two prominent army officers amongst them. They were Colonel Henry Namphy, and General William Regala. The goal obviously was to ensure stability and maintain confidence in the country.
During that time and perhaps because of the inevitable immediate confusion, civilians took justice into their own hands. Many people from the populace killed former members of the rogue paramilitary group officially known in French as Volontaires de la Sécurité Nationale (VSN), or Tontons Makouts, or makout. As the right-hand men and women of the Duvalier régime, they served throughout the country as enforcers of the dictatorial régime.
Known for their impunity and the fear they provoked, many people were happy of the Makouts' demise. Since they represented a counterbalance to the regular army, the army now in power was in no hurry to protect them. Hence, many people used that time to settle old scores, take revenge against people who were directly or indirectly involved in the murder or disappearance of a close or even distant relative. Many Makouts and quite a few other innocent individuals thus died an atrocious death at the hands of unruly crowds, eager to show their hatred of the former régime through carnage and blood.
Meanwhile, the exiles were returning into the country in waves. They were pouring like warm water falling from the skies of this tropical land. They were happy, and so were the vast majority of the people. They brought in with them ideas, knowledge, money, hope, courage, and in many cases the determination to have a new Haiti that would finally become a modern nation, ruled by law and by democratically elected leaders.
A-The first surprise (the rain)
The first post-Duvalier government included former members of the Duvalier régime, a Human Rights lawyer, and members of the military. Looking back, it is obvious that influential western governments through their embassies encouraged this arrangement. They meant well, at least through their own eyes. As a Human Rights lawyer for instance, Gérard Gourgue was well-known in Haiti as an opponent of the Duvalier régime who cared for issues regarding the safety of citizens in general, and of accused opponents of that régime. His role in that governmental body known as CNG or Comité National de Gouvernement was to assure that people's rights were protected and respected. As we were in a transitional period, it was equally important for the partisans of the former régime to know that they still have some ears in Government.
This task would be assured by Alix Cinéas, a former Minister of Duvalier who was well-known through his reign, and had contacts with all powerful elements of the ancient régime. Since the Tonton Makouts were totally discredited because of their past exactions, and since the military represented a more stable and viable institution, capable of at least help maintaining order, two low-key members of that corps, Henry Namphy and William Regala would be chosen to as well participate in that counsel of government.
A new Constitution
The first task of a new constitutional body was to write the new laws of the country. This new Constitution would in turn be voted up or down by the people of Haiti during a referendum.
The texts of that new Constitution are democratic in principle and in kind, and try to deal head-on with the issue of potential dictatorial power by a new government. They limited for instance the powers of all new presidents by creating the post of Prime Minister who would not only be the head of government, but also chosen by the majority party in Parliament. The president could only be elected twice by the electorate and spend two, nonconsecutive terms of five years each. Elected officials would cover the entire geographic map of Haiti. Measures for transparency and accountability would become matter of law. Institutions would be created to ensure checks and balances in government.
The Electoral Council would be chosen based on choices of elected officials at the local level. Every remnant of the dictatorial régimes of the past would be uprooted according to that Constitution, so that Haiti can truly become a democratic nation that understands the importance of institutions and their strength, over the matter of individual leaders and their "kindness".
This new Constitution expressed a new will to making Haiti a modern and democratic nation. It was fair to hope then, that Haiti was on its way to true and lasting political stability, a prerequisite for economic and social progress.
No one suspected that the next 16 years would be so difficult, that the transition to democratic rule would be so difficult. Everyone thought at one point or another that "we were finally near". Yet, at every stage in this process, there would be a derailment which required and still requires if not a halt, at least and perhaps worse some very disturbing social, political, and economic consequences on the country.
There were first the aborted November 1987 presidential elections; then the overthrow of an army-backed elected leader (Leslie Manigat) less than 4 months after his taking over the oath of office in 1988; then there were the series of coup by members of the army; then finally the coming on stage of the current president of Haiti, Jean-Bertrand Aristide.
A slow process it has been indeed. Yet for some reason, when one looks at the reality of Haiti today, it is fair to say with a measured level of sincerity that progress has been made. How can one assess that progress, in light of the once-again difficult times that Haiti is going through?
Blacks, mulattoes, and the eventual rise of Duvalier
To understand Duvalier the father is to first understand the traditional role of color in Haitian politics. Although virtually everyone now admits that it is an erroneous notion to base upon to govern a state, Haiti had suffered tremendously of this mentality throughout the country's history.
After the war of independence, Haiti was shortly rules from 1804 to 1806 by the father of that glorious struggle Jean-Jacques Dessalines. Soon after Dessalines' assassination, the country was divided into two parts, and ruled over by two leaders of that independence movement, one black and one mulatto. In the North was Henri Christophe otherwise known as "Le Bâtisseur" (The Builder), and in the West and the South was Alexandre Pétion otherwise known as "Papa Bon Coeur" (Father Good Heart). They both made political and economic decisions based on ideology and their own priority.
For Christophe, the priority was to build a strong new nation economically and militarily so Haiti could fight off potential threats from the French or any other colonial power. Thus Christophe built forts, the most famous of which is La Citadelle La Ferrière. He also built mansions like his own official residence, Le Palais de Sans-Souci, le Palais aux 365 Portes, built a royalty, rebuilt the economy through large scale agriculture, and tried to educate the citizenry. Pétion on the other hand chose to divide the land and make it possible for virtually anyone who wanted, to buy a piece of property.
Although Christophe's policies were harsh and cruel, he largely succeeded in rebuilding the economy that was devastated after years of revolutionary war. Pétion, despite the many incentives he gave to the former slaves population so they could go back to farming on a large scale, failed to bring prosperity in the West and the South on as large a scale as Christophe did. Worse, by the time Pétion and Christophe had died and Pétion's successor Jean-Pierre Boyer ruled over the entire western side of the island, conditions had begun to deteriorate.
Boyer was a mulatto, and so was Pétion. Boyer, who finalized Haiti's independence from the French through the deal that he signed on with King Charles X in 1825, thus caused the new nation to accept a dept of 150 million French francs.
If Boyer's deal assured Haiti's entry into the world as an independent country, it also caused tremendous economic strains to that newly emerging nation. Boyer, who eventually dominated the entire island of Hispaniola (East and West) for more than 20 years, was finally overthrown in 1843. His policies however, along with those of his predecessor Pétion, had major negative long-term impacts on Haiti's economy. Boyer just like Pétion favored an economic class which they belonged to even before the country's independence, the mulattoes.
The color dilemma
The vast majority of the former slaves were blacks, dark-skinned with no experience in commerce. They never learned how to take advantage of Pétion's even limited economic incentives. They were at first mostly interested in enjoying their newfound freedom, not fully aware of the responsibilities that come along with it. What they cared mostly about was their individual peace with food, shelter, and a plot of land to cultivate. Grandiose goals such as owning large plantations and becoming an economic class with clout were not the first of their concerns.
The mulatto class on the other hand was better ready as a group to take advantage of such. Quite a few of them were educated, at least better educated than the former slaves of African origin. Some of them owned large properties and were rich farmers, even during colonial times. They owned slaves and had friends and lovers amongst the white colonizers. The mulatto group as a class owned as much as one-third of all farming lands in then St-Domingue.
This dichotomy and these two groups' empirical experiences largely contributed to the divide that had grown even stronger in that new nation. As the rich and landed mulatto elite became richer, and as the local population increased from some hundreds of thousands to millions, the largely poor black underclass became poorer. The basic reason behind this economic dichotomy stems from a couple of reasons.
As the mulatto class became more and more powerful economically, they made sure that they obtain or maintain their political clout, depending on the historical moment. Many of them were also educated. They married among their peers in the economic class they belonged to, or with other men and women from Europe.
The blacks on the other hand were not per se relegated to the back burner by the sheer will of the economic elite. It just happened that as time went on, the economic gap between the poor blacks and the rich mulattoes widened. Therefore, so did the social gap. Even amongst the blacks who raised themselves up to great achievement within the confines of Haitian society, they swam along with their new friends of the powerful economic class. They either married high-society women from their economic class, or women from Europe, especially France where they used to go for higher studies.
Even Haitian president Lysius Félicité Salomon (1879-1888), the dark-skinned pillar of the Parti National (power to the majority), and whom was known for his great intellect and his effort to introduce the poor blacks into the political process, was married to a French white woman.
Overtime, the socioeconomic reality had deepened the divide between the mulattoes and the blacks. The mulattoes (and the educated blacks) spoke French, were officially Catholics, went to school in Haiti under the guidance of French tutors or teachers, and then went to France were they went to university. They essentially became a distinct cultural minority group in Haiti.
The uneducated blacks spoke only Haitian, or Creole as many like to call the language. They were illiterate. They resided mostly in rural areas or poorer sections of larger cities, and worked mostly for a largely, lighter-skinned economic elite. They practiced Vodou even when they called themselves Catholics.
Essentially therefore, two distinct cultural groups took rots in Haiti: one that is Eurocentric, and the other Afrocentric. What came of that divide reveals mostly differences in cultural attachment and economic imbalances, which would eventually become a powerful emotional tool used by sometimes ill-informed but always exploitative dark-skinned politicians. François Duvalier would come to epitomize the worst kinds of aberration that derived from these differences.
The Duvalier era and the consequences of "ethno-populism"
Perhaps short-sighted, perhaps limited in his understanding or analysis of the facts, Duvalier decided to use the complexity in the socioeconomic rapport between these two groups, and organized the massacre of mulattoes. He also espoused the majority's religion, Vodou, not as a good and kindhearted representative but rather, as a mean-spirited criminal. His reign wrapped in blood, supposedly had the protection of the saint of Death in the Haitian, Vodou mythology, Boisrond Samedi.
Duvalier was effective in dividing the economic classes without changing the fundamental economic structure of Haitian society. What he did better than any of his so called "nationalist" predecessors, was to begin the integration of the masses into the country's politics. He armed the poor and gave him and her, the Tonton Makout uniform as an authority figure. He confronted head-on the Catholic hierarchy, and even broke ranks with them. They at first excommunicated him. Later on, they made a deal with him, which "expunged him of his sins" and also made it possible for a black clergy in Haiti, and for the Catholic Church to recover its influence in Haiti.
If most Haitian political leaders until then stood away from the religion of the poor, if they all espoused even tacitly or unofficially the idea of Catholicism as both Haiti's national and official religion, Duvalier's move towards Vodou was bold.
By espousing the Church of the poor and its saints (lwas) and demons, Duvalier espoused as well the values of the dark, illiterate, and poor farmers and their children. No leader before him since the country's independence was so bold in his embracing the poor man's religion, Vodou. That kind of populism helped Duvalier sustain in the face of national and international adversities, and even enmity. Even when the village poor wouldn't want to embrace Duvalier, or didn't trust him, the houngan or mambo- Vodou's priest or priestess- of that village was one of his. Many of them were part of his network of spies who helped him control the entire country.
This is the kind of populism that Duvalier displayed, which allowed him and his son to rule Haiti for the next 28 years. Claiming that he was fighting against the traditional elite and for economic justice for the poor dark majority, François Duvalier's policies were contradictory because of the long-term economic effect on the overall economy.
He killed high-ranking military officers, supposedly so they could not terrorize the population and be a tool of the light-skinned and Eurocentric landed and comprador bourgeoisie. Yet, he built a terror network called the Tontons Makout with the ultimate goal of staying in power by terrorizing all his opponents, regardless of their color or creed.
The stipulation was that he wanted to create a new and strong economic class deeply rooted in the country's culture and ethnic majority. Yet, those who became the saddest victims of his policies are the very people he pretended he wanted to help: the poor farmer. His policies caused mass migration to larger cities like Cap-Haïtien and Port-au-Prince, and the lives of those who remained behind in the rural communities never improved. If anything, things got worse.
By the end of the régime he had built, the light-skinned bourgeoisie was as strong economically as always. The few blacks who had "made it" as he wished, espoused the same values which Duvalier the father pretended to have stood so firmly against. The country became poorer. Emigration to places like the United states and Canada became a permanent feature in the heart and minds of those from modest and middle class origins, and who had not left the country yet for good. Vodou remained and still is, a religion regarded with derision amongst the middle and upper income Haitians. Rather than making things better for the black majority, he made things worse and by the early 1970's, Haitians were leaving the country on poorly built boats, to go to places like the Bahamas, and Miami, Florida in the United States.
Hence Duvalier, with his policies built on a false sense of pride and national identity, did more harm to the Haitian economy than all of his predecessors except perhaps the mulatto Jean-Pierre Boyer (1818-1843).
Duvalier's populism based on ethnicity (ethno-populism) was only a front to hide his thirst for not only power but also ill-acquired wealth, and his thirst for blood. When his son had left Haiti in 1986, he was, according to news reports from the West, richer by 800 million US dollars, a colossal sum for a country and a people so poor.
It is thus true that being on the side of the "people" can pay quite handsomely at times. It is especially true when policies are not coordinated, or when all powers sit at the helm of one leader, rather than distributed rationally, and governed by institutions headed by an effective and truly enlightened leader.
B-The post-Duvalier era ― The second surprise (the deluge)
The first challenge for Haiti after Jean-Claude Duvalier had left and the new Constitution was approved, was to have free and fair elections. Once that was done, the next challenge was to make it possible for an elected government to stay in office for its constitutionally allowed time. after the Constitution was approved in a referendum in March 1987, the November 1987 elections debacle, the coup by military leaders against Leslie Manigat in 1988, and the presidential elections of December 1990, everyone thought that Haiti was finally on the way to progress and stability.
Then came September 1991, when again those military leaders overthrew the newly elected government. Finally, after Aristide returned to power in October 1994, with the direct help of the United States and the International Community, everyone thought that this power game was over. After all, a few months after his return to power, Aristide managed to rid the country of the army, a decision that has yet to be constitutionally approved by Parliament through a referendum. Eventually however, everyone realized that Haiti's political landscape is a lot more complicated than it appears.
For sure, there were parliamentary elections in 1995, which the Lavalas political organization OPL won overwhelmingly then. The opposition grudgingly accepted their defeat. Then came 1997, when there were parliamentary elections again. By then, current Haitian president Jean-Bertrand Aristide was out of power, and in disagreement with some in the top leadership of the Lavalas political party OPL. He defected and built his own part, OFL. OFL won big, thanks mostly to Aristide's popularity.
According to the OPL leadership, these elections were stolen by Aristide and the then Haitian president René Préval. They fought hard and convinced the International Community to investigate those elections results. Préval went ahead and appointed a commission to examine those elections results. They were never published, but indicated according to unofficial sources, that there were serious flaws and many irregularities in those elections. Thus, the winners of the 1997 elections never sat in parliament.
When in January 1999, the term of the 1995 elected officials in the Haitian parliament expired, then president Préval declared that he noticed (he used the very precise and cold French verb "constater", to describe the situation), that the parliamentarians' term in office had expired. He thus asked them to give back to the proper authorities all that they owed the State in terms of official vehicles, official passports, etc.
That appears to have been a well-planned mini-coup. Indeed, as the majority party in Parliament OPL, opposed to the Executive branch after the schism with Aristide, was becoming more abrasive, more confrontational, and less responsive to the Executive's proposals, they (OPL) also made a series of mistakes, one of which being that they did not vote a budget for more than two years, and asked for all sorts of weird requirements to elect a new Prime Minister.
After all dusts were settled, the opposition united as a group, called themselves the Dialogue Forum (in French, Espace de Concertation), negotiated with the government the procedures for new elections and the timeframe. After much delay, the elections took place on May 21, 2000.
Once again, Aristide's party the OFL won approximately 80 percent of the vote. The chief observer of the OAS Mr. Orlando Marville complained of a defect in the process. The government refused to cooperate in correcting those defects. So did at first the electoral council under the leadership of Mr. Léon Manus. Since then, Haiti is at a halt.
The complaint's substance, the actors, and the halt
It all seemed at first an easy issue to resolve. Mr. Marville, while reviewing the accounting procedures used for approval of the balloting, realized that some newly elected Senators did not obtain an outright 50 percent plus one vote, of the count from their respective constituencies. He decided to bring the issue up to the appropriate authorities at the electoral and governmental levels. His first hurdle came about when the head of the electoral council, Mr. Léon Manus, expressed publicly his anger at Mr. Marville, suggesting that the latter was violating the principle of Haiti as an independent State.
The government's representatives shied away from Marville's suggestions. The government and the electoral council's argument then, was based on the theory of precedence, deeply rooted in Anglo-American law. They argued that the results for all previous senatorial races were calculated the same way since 1990, and that the OAS was being unfair.
Eventually however, Manus was convinced that Marville was correct in his argument for a second round for those Senators, and refused to bend to pressure from the government to publish the results as is. He opted finally to leave Haiti for good, citing fear for his life. Marville never got his wish granted for a second round between the top two contenders of those ten Senate races.
The OAS observers and Marville chose to leave Haiti and not monitor the second round of elections for other legislative and local posts, or the November 2000 presidential and parliamentary races. Worse, the opposition stayed on the sideline, and none of the challenging presidential candidates, apart from Aristide himself, came from the main opposition groups. Since then, a series of events have occurred, none of which having profoundly changed the political landscape.
After Aristide was elected president, he tried to negotiate with the main opposition groups their inclusion into the new government. They all refused. Meanwhile, he successfully negotiated with the then departing Clinton administration, an eight-point accord which includes issues such as curbing the illegal drug flow from Colombia through Haiti to the United States, and the departure of the Senators whose elections were mired in the May 2000 counting process controversy. The government also negotiated with the OAS and offered, with the consent of elected representatives, to shorten their term by two years. Thus, a Senator who was elected for 6 years must participate in elections in 4 years; a 4-year elected mayor, or deputy, must participate in elections in 2 years.
Also, to make space for a rapid negotiated settlement with the opposition, the Haitian government (GOH) convinced eight Senators to resign, in keeping with the deal made with both the Clinton administration and the OAS.
Moreover, Aristide and his deputies in the OFL began courting assiduously the main opposition groups, which by then had converged into just one main group called the Convergence. They have had since then, as many as twenty rounds of negotiations with the government and the party in power the OFL, none of which had brought positive results or a definite settlement to the contentious issues.
The actors
What makes it most surprising to many is how Haiti's political reality seem to have deteriorated following the fall of Duvalier. It is not that Haiti is once again registering mass killings of opponents. In fact, by contrast to the Duvalier years, the majority of the government's opponents reside inside the country, travel freely within and outside the country, organize and rally (at times under threat from street partisans of the régime), and express their view freely in the local and international media. The real issues that keep the country from getting stable at this stage are historical, cultural, and also political.
It seems difficult for Haitian politicians for instance to accept defeat and bow to the winners in the electoral process. Rather than preparing themselves for the next round of elections, they seem to focus mostly on impending upon their adversaries– usually those in power- and making sure that they never succeed at accomplishing much for the country. Every time since the 1990 presidential elections, the ones who collected less ballots in the voting booths complain of irregularities, real or fictitious.
Let's go back to 1994, after the return of the constitutionally elected government of Jean-Bertrand Aristide. Less than a year later in 1995, elections were organized and OPL, then a Lavalas organization, won. Albeit timidly the opposition protested the results, and claimed irregularities. When in 1997, the OFL won seats in Parliament that were previously controlled by OPL members, the latter complained vehemently of irregularities. Although it was proven this time to be true, it is clear that regardless, Aristide's party the OFL would have won those elections.
The problem of irregularities then, seemed to have been more due to administrative mistakes, than outright theft. During those balloting and according to that never published report, OPL and OFL members engaged in the same kinds of fraud. The only problem was, that OFL had more voters and thus, the issue really went against them.
In the year 2000, the international elections observers had determined that overall, the elections were free and fair. Their issue was with the manner in which the electoral council had declared certain candidates winners in the Senate race, when they should have gone for a second round of elections. While the International Community was focusing on this issue, threatening economic sanctions against the Haitian government, the opposition began to declare the elections null and void, full of irregularities, and overall worthless.
As the saying goes, constant grinding can turn an iron clod into a needle. Thus eventually, the international media began to repeat the opposition's argument as facts. News reports nowadays from Haiti and the international press use that very same argument by the opposition. They tend to insinuate quite forcefully that the May 2000, elections were not as free and fair as they had previously reported. The current Haitian Parliament is called the contested parliament, and even the president himself whose popularity is still undeniable despite setbacks, is called the November 26 president.
This does not mean in any way that, were the party in power the ones who had lost the elections in a fair and transparent manner, that they would be using different arguments. What is instead clear is the constant focus, on power, of Haitian politicians, rather than the use of that power to doing good. Haitian politicians of all groups or credos believe that power only resides in the hands of the rulers. The lack of patience, the apparent misunderstanding of the concept of democratic electoral process and its requirements are nowadays the biggest impediment to a stable and viable Haitian society.
Also, the negative construct in that country's politics keep the parties away from the goal of respecting the electoral process as the most viable way of attaining power. Haitians traditionally have acquired power through force. Now that they no longer have an army to rely on, perhaps they will change and start focusing on different ways to getting to power. Still, it is clear that democracy is an irreversible process in Haiti, despite the difficulties, present and to come.
B- That second surprise
To those analysts who closely watch Haiti, this is great surprise. To a Haitian who knows the terrain however, there is nothing new.
Why of all places Haiti, which is relatively a small country, cannot seem to get its house in order? How come after more than 16 years since the end of the Duvalier dictatorship, Haiti is in such state of disorder? How come the Philippines which have come through the same process at around the same time, in February 1986, with the end of the Marcos régime, is now way ahead of Haiti in terms of at least, overall political stability?
Haiti's case is both easy and complex. There is first of all the historical argument. This is a country that took birth following a successful slave rebellion and struggle for freedom. It was a matter of "right" against "wrong". The moral "right" was the fight for freedom. The moral "wrong" was the plantation owners who were for slavery, refusing to grant freedom to the slaves. The final political outcome came about through a bitter and bloody struggle. Haitian politicians since then, have never been able to break away from that mood, that pattern, that clear-cut and simplistic way of looking at realpolitik, as a matter of "right vs. wrong". Because Haiti was created through a successful revolution that shook the very fabric of the old society, most Haitian politicians since then will argue for revolution, rather than suggesting gradual and sensible change.
Contrary to other countries where people won their independence through negotiations, Haitian politicians have yet to learn to "find the gray in the pile". To them, power cannot be shared with the "enemy". The "enemy" on the other hand, is no one but a political adversary with perhaps a different but yet progressive vision for the country.
Adding to that problem is perhaps the issue of the political experiences of many of Haiti's current political leaders. Except for perhaps a handful of them, most of Haiti's leaders lived during the Duvalier dictatorship, either in Haiti, or the most influential and relevant ones in places like Mexico, Chile, and Venezuela. These countries are considered in all fairness, emerging democracies. In the 1960's, 1970's, and even 1980's, these countries were still struggling to either build up their own democracy, or even to craft a democratic system. It is thus no accident that the most vigorous, and it's fair to say, obstructionist opponents to the current régime in Haiti lived in such countries and also believed themselves until recently at least in the infallibility of Marxism, of the "dictatorship of the proletariat", with political parties espousing such views.
Gérard Pierre-Charles of the OPL, lived in places like Mexico and also according to some reports Chile during the dictator Augusto Pinochet time, and was one of the highest ranking members of Haiti's communist party known under the acronym PUCH (Parti Unifié Communiste Haïtien). Hubert de Ronceray worked for Duvalier as his Minister of Social Affairs, until he turned against them. The list goes on and on, and shows how their poor experiences with stable and successful democracies explain partially their difficulty in understanding the art of making political deals, to give and take.
Haitian politicians who lived in stable and successful democracies on the other hand, tend to be less confrontational, and more deferential to the process. Perhaps the most successful such example is Marc Bazin. Bazin, despite his loss in 1990 in a presidential race that until Aristide posed his candidacy everyone expected him to win, has still managed to work quite successfully while maintaining his integrity, with military leaders like Raoul Cédras during the military coup, Baby Doc Duvalier in the early 1980's, and now Aristide himself the current president of Haiti.
Turning Haiti's political culture into a non-confrontational mode is indeed quite a challenge. Unless that battle is won however, Haiti will remain unstable and the country's meager democratic gains will remain shaky, and of no real value to the country's citizens. Perhaps one of the best ways to win that battle is through economic growth.
Economy, a new equation
For most in the modern world, the equations of economic growth and politics are intertwined. After all, the best politics is administration, and administration implies working towards progress for the good of society at large.
In the Haiti of the 1970's and early ‘80's, the issue or debate was always and only about development, which implicitly suggests working for a better economy nationwide. The term strong and healthy economy, for that development, was however never employed as specifically and correctly as it is now.
Today's Haiti has more economists actively debating the issue individually and in group than ever before. Economic nonprofit groups from the left like PAPDA (Platforme Alternatif Pour le Développement d'Haïti), and from the right like ECOSOF, now dominate the debate on ways and means for better economic development in Haiti. The National Bank BRH (Banque de la République d'Haïti) puts out economic data on a monthly basis, and there are statistical data available on their website (http://www.brh.net) as old as 1975, and as current as the previous month of the current year.
Despite all this concentration on economic data, and the incurring debates, the economy has not moved yet as fast as it could have otherwise. The government of Haiti and its governments following the May 2000, legislative and municipal elections, had not received much direct economic help from most major economic powers of Europe, or from the United States. The countries that have consistently offered economic help to Haiti are Japan and Taiwan. Western Europe and the United States are still waiting for a negotiated solution to the conflict between the government and the largest opposition group, the Convergence, to resume financial help directly to the government.
The results of what many call a virtual economic embargo on Haiti, are multifold. On the one hand potential investors local and foreign lack confidence in the system, and have shied away from opening up factories or invest in most other ventures. On the other hand, there is a crisis of confidence in the system, considering that some of the most prominent politicians in the opposition call for the outright overthrow of the constitutional government. Worse, the State of Haiti, run by the Lavalas régime, has halted most if not all investments into the agricultural sector, a vital part of the country's economy.
Many claim that the government had done so to satisfy some of big businesses' and powerful governments' desiderata, in the name of global economy.
An agrarian reform, which began shortly after René Préval became president of Haiti in 1996, has come at least in the public eye, virtually to a complete halt. Préval while president had even created an institute, the INARA (Institut National de Réforme Agraire), with primary goals of agrarian reform and logistical help to poor farmers. The record for that institute is mixed at best, and Haiti's agricultural output had not yet increase by much, as many had hoped it would have been by now. The record is mixed because of lack of political will, and inefficient administration.
Agriculture and politics
On the lack of political will side, the issue may be directly related to the matter of global economy. In other words, there is at least the perception that an economic giant like the United States applies undue pressure on the government of Haiti, so they do not invest as much in their agriculture as they would have liked to.
US farmers do indeed have much to gain by selling to Haiti their surpluses of rice, a food product that Haitians use heavily and regularly. American farmers are also subsidized, have the best farming machinery in the world, and can easily outdo their Haitian counterparts with their outdated productive techniques, lack of sophisticated farming tools, and limited farmlands. Hence, even if the United States or other more economically powerful nations do not pressure the government of Haiti to disinvest in the agricultural sector, as many suggest they do, the reality for Haitian farmers would have still been the same: their level of competitiveness would have caused them to falter unless the State agrees to heavily subsidize them, or build incentives in the system for large buyers to purchase homegrown agricultural products.
The second issue that is still hampering Haiti's agriculture is the issue of record. The country's record of land possession was and still is ill-organized and in most cases simply unreliable. Small groups of farmers for instance during the early 1980's used to fight against other small groups of farmers over land ownership in the Artibonite region where some of the most fertile lands for rice cultivation exist.
Government never really focused on that issue, resulting in the death of many innocent victims and even their family members. In other cases, farmers own land which they cannot prove that they do, or claim lands which are not theirs, but which they are trying to adversely possess. Still in other cases, many wealthy Haitians buy farmlands which they rent to poor farmers, in a system that is so detrimental to the poor grower that the land is almost never exploited to its full potential.
Depending on the politics of the time and whose side poor farmers are on, they can own land today, which they may lose tomorrow when another government of a different orientation comes along. These politics affect wealthy land owners as well. One of the most famous and current such cases of land controversy in Haiti is that opposing peasants from the region of Piatre, and a wealthy Haitian business man and his family, Olivier Nadal.
According to Nadal, the lawsuit pending against him, and the accusations of massacre of peasants in the 1990's who tried to occupy the Piatre land is all politics. He claims that he is being persecuted because he is against the Lavalas régime. He has since then left the country and lives in the United States virtually in self-exile. We have yet to have a trial where this issue is brought to light, and the whole truth about that issue comes out.
Thus, the agricultural sector has to reckon with two difficult political and administrative problems: lack of political will and stamina to withstand international pressure; and use of the land issue for real or imagined political gain, since the record of ownership of land is quite weak or perhaps poorly administered.
Agriculture and administration
It is clear that Haiti, typical of most third world countries, is poorly managed. This is so regardless of government's efforts in the short run, because Haiti's best and brightest continue on leaving the country, a phenomenon that had begun in the 1960's with Duvalier in power. Government is therefore constrained to work with what it has, which is not much. The country, as it is experiencing a crisis of confidence with its continuing political problems, cannot absorb talented human resources personnel from abroad or give them incentives to return to Haiti and earn a decent living through working for the State.
Aside from some industry like the Banking industry, the private sector seems disinterested in investing into the economy, in a way that would attract educated and talented Haitian citizens who live abroad to go back and live there. The consequences are by now well-known: poor administration, and lack of appropriate talent. The agricultural sector thus suffers, even though Haiti has one School of Agronomy that has been functioning for decades and the newly created INARA with at least at first the full support of government. In fact, INARA is and has been practically inexistent in the public eye for quite some time now. If anything, government and the current régime which have been in power continuously for almost 8 years since September 1994, have adopted policies that sometimes seem quite contradictory in the public eye.
The consequences of poorly conceived or inconsistent policies in that sector have been negative on the overall economy. For example, the added value in Haitian gourdes, for the agricultural sector had gone from 1,657,766 gourdes (The gourde is the unit of the Haitian money. One gourde nowadays is worth approximately 4 cents (less than a nickel) in 1987-88, to only 1,422,791 gourdes by 1999-2000. This is according to the country's national bank's statistics on the web at http://www.brh.net/vasecteurprimaire.pdf, and it is so despite government's effort.
After the Institute for Agrarian Reform (INARA) was created, resources went directly into that institute and work was done which benefited mostly poor farmers. They tried to organize the distributed farm land and farmers into cooperatives so they could produce more by working in groups. The two regions where they did so most successfully were the Artibonite region and the Northeastern region. They ordered and distributed fertilizer to groups of peasants or in many more cases, bought the fertilizer on the world market and sold it to the farmers at preferential prices. They still do in many cases. Unfortunately, poor distribution mechanisms and corruption have in many instances made it difficult for peasants to benefit from this program.
What is left in the economy are different other sectors which have yet to become more dynamic. The banking sector has grown up exponentially over the past decade. The assembly industry has not grown as fast. Neither have other sectors like tourism, or services.
The banking sector
Up until the mid 1990's, Haiti's banking industry was dominated mostly by foreign conglomerates like Banque Nationale de Paris, City Bank, or Banque Royale du Canada. Their niche was mostly if not exclusively in the Port-au-Prince metropolis. Since the late 1980's Haitian banks have begun to confidently invade the market. There are now at least two large Haitian banks in Haiti that have branches throughout the country, Sogebank and Socabank. Those banks are in most large cities of the Centre, the North, the South, and the Grande-Anse departments. And of course you can find their branches everywhere in the Port-au-Prince metropolis. They employ hundreds of individuals with the proper skills and experiences in the banking industry, and use a banking system quite up to par with many other foreign banks in terms of administrative savvy. They buy out other less successful banks, Haitian and foreign, and have been able to compete with those banks with effective marketing strategy.
There have been accusations of money laundering against most successful banks in Haiti, without much specificity. In fact, those accusations had been so constant and direct the last four years that consequently, government had to draft new regulatory procedures in regards to depositing, etc. Overall, it is still a system that shows great potential on the market since the economy has yet to grow at a pace which ensures confidence in the country's development.
Looking at the chart of the tertiary sector in the Haitian economy over the last 20 years clearly shows how healthy the banking industry has been and continues to be. The added value of the banking industry has gone from 9,318 million gourdes in 1975-76, down to 5,825 million gourdes by 1987, a year after Duvalier was gone, to 11,761 million gourdes by 1999-2000. It is indeed the healthiest in the tertiary sector, and in fact, of the whole sectors or sub-sectors in the Haitian economy.
The assembly industry
This industry is recognized under the economic concept of secondary sector in the Haitian economy. It comprises key sub-sectors like manufacturing, water and electricity, and construction.
Aside from the construction side of the tertiary sector, this sector of the economy has gone down from its high in the 1970's mostly due to political problems. Starting in the early 1970's under Baby Doc Duvalier, investment in the assembly industry in Haiti grew from 663, 650 millions of gourdes in terms of value added in 1975, to 814,273 millions in 1985-1986. It had gone downhill pretty consistently since then with some variables on the upside between 1988 and 1990, to be only at 342,820 millions gourdes in 1999-2000.
This industry had been going downhill because of many different reasons. For one thing, the multinationals have not felt safe to invest in Haiti since after the fall of Duvalier because of political turmoil and instability. In fact, there has been mostly divestment in the assembly industry. There was an upswing in the added value of these industries in the years 1988-1990, when the pioneers in that economic sector thought that Haiti was about to regain stability, following the elections of Leslie Manigat in 1988. Moreover, when there were preparations for presidential and parliamentary elections in 1990, Marc Louis Bazin the World Bank's "darling" and reputable economist, was expected to win.
When Aristide became president that year, followed by a coup d'état the following year, all hopes were dashed. Worse, even after his return to the presidency in 1994, the multinationals took a wait-and-see attitude. They wanted to be sure that his policies would have been advantageous to the assembly industry.
Their experience and perception meanwhile indicated otherwise. The political left had been a constant challenge for that industry, asking them for more transparency, better working conditions, and better pay for the Haitian laborer who wasn't making what is considered livable wages at the time.
Now that everything is on hold, despite perhaps the government's effort to encourage those and other kinds of industries and companies to invest in Haiti, the hopes are thin that such occurrences are for any time in the near future. It will probably not take 20, or even 5 years for the manufacturing sector to begin reopening in Haiti, and creating employment for Haitians. Still, the confidence level has to be reestablished first, which the patrons of that industry find lacking.
Meanwhile, the Haitian government has taken another route. They have decided to work mainly so far with the Dominican Republic, in creating free zone enterprises. So far as we know, this is a difficult proposition.
Recently during the month of April 2002, the government of Haiti (GOH) had inaugurated a free zone enterprise with the Dominicans in the Northeastern region of the country. That venture should make it possible for the creation of more than 1,500 jobs in the short run, and perhaps even 4,000 jobs a few years later.
Unfortunately, with this deal came another problem. The agricultural sector which has always been considered a major sector of the Haitian economy, took a serious blow when 80 percent of the arable land, according to many credible news reports, were given away to the Dominican consortium to build their new factories. This had caused major headaches for economists from the left-leaning economic group PAPDA, and even for some staunchly pro-market Haitian economists.
The Northeast is considered one of the poorest regions of Haiti, already a very poor country. Opening up a factory on those arable lands compels the few remaining farmers to go work for those factories. The government then, no longer has to deal with the issue of helping those farmers to produce in larger quantities and more rationally, which is a detrimental move in the long run for the Haitian economy.
It just does not make much sense for government to take such route. Poverty is so pronounced in the Northeast, that they would have been able to find factory workers to work at that plant, and still maintain agriculture as a viable, even if not yet profitable, economic activity for farmers.
All these issues bring up to light, the matters of planning and government's commitment to a homegrown economy. Is government interested in developing the Haitian economy in a way that allows Haiti to have a degree of independence towards foreign nations, or is government, in the short run at least, more interested in satisfying the International Community in order to withstand political pressure from the largest opposition group, the Convergence?
Haiti's economy needs more than just a shot in the arm to grow at say, a rate of even 4 percent annually. The economic indicators for the past ten years show mixed results on all sides.
In the primary sector which comprises agriculture, extracting industry such as bauxite, the fishing industry, and cattle, the growth from 1989-1990, had gone from −2.30 percent, to −11.25 percent in the years 1993-1994 at the height of the coup years, to a meager +2.17 percent in 1997-98, and again a slowdown to −19 percent in 1999-2000.
In the secondary sector which comprises the manufacturing industry, water and electricity, and construction, the growth from 1989-90, had gone from +.54 percent to −7.95 percent in 1993-94, to +6.5 percent in 1997-98, and another slowdown to only +1.74 percent in 1999-2000. This rather meager growth is due partly to activities in the construction business.
In the tertiary sector which comprises key industries such as commerce, restaurant and hotels, communication and transports, real estate, financial institutions like the banking industry, the growth level had not been that high either. In the year 1989-1990, this sector of the economy registered a growth of only +1.76 percent. In 1993-1994, the growth level was −4.4 percent. In 1999-2000, this economic sector only grew by +1.41 percent.
There are two ways of looking at those figures. In the first instance, considering the difficulties that Haiti had gone and is still going through, this is not such a bad economic report card. The Préval government between 1997 and 2001, for example built more schools throughout the country than any other previous administration.
The long-term effect of that policy of investing in people through education, will take years to bring about results. Nevertheless, the long-term economic benefit of such policy, if followed up with consistent and convergent governmental policies, can only be positive on the entire country's economy.
On the other hand, the economy at least over the last 10 years, has averaged in the negative fold if one considers certain important other factors. First of all, the Haitian gourde, up until the fall of Duvalier, was worth 20 percent of the American dollar. The exchange rate for every American dollar was always 5 Haitian gourdes. It was so as a result of a deal made by previous Haitian governments with the United States, following the US overtaking the gold reserves in Haitian banks a short time before they occupied Haiti from 1915 to 1934.
After Duvalier had fled, the rules of the market began to dominate Haiti's economy, and thus the gourde was allowed to float accordingly. Nowadays, for every American dollar, one needs anywhere between 25 to 30 Haitian gourdes. If one factors in inflation in that index, it is then fair to say that Haiti has mostly experienced negative economic growth, at least over the past 15 years.
The Diaspora in the Haitian economy
What hides, or better, helps control somewhat the economic troubles of Haiti are remittances from the Diaspora, valued anywhere between 500 and 800 million US dollars per year. That is money sent by family members who live in the United States, Canada, and some parts of Europe. Those dollars received by other family members in Haiti allow in thousands of instances, families to not only survive but, to send their kids to school, eat even once a day by the average, have a roof over their head, etc. This remittance system has even become to some economic analysts a form of welfare system which is not provided by the State but rather by individual family members.
Another major factor in Haiti's economy, coming from the Diaspora, is also small businesses. Over the last ten to twenty years, and especially after the fall of Duvalier, many small businesses that had started abroad, especially in the United States, have tried to take roots in Haiti. Even in the late 1970's and the early 1980's, as population pressure began to be felt in the Port-au-Prince metropolis and small destitute farmers began to move to larger cities, entrepreneurial Haitians who live abroad began to open up shops.
The first such businesses were things like money transfer places like HATREXCO (Haitian-American Transfer and Exchange Commission). Once Duvalier left, other Haitian entrepreneurs began to invade the market, and opened up all sorts of businesses related to the Printing industry, Telecommunications, Consulting firms, Clothing shops, etc.
To date, the statistics on such businesses is not well-defined. Their overall impact on the economy is not calculated as precisely as necessary. Their capital, the average number of employees that they have, their overall revenue, their expansion on the market, and the products or services that they offer are not separated and calculated so government can build in more incentives to encourage more Haitian entrepreneurs living abroad to come and invest in the economy.
The economic outlook
At present time, the Haitian government is still negotiating with the Convergence opposition as they're trying to bring an end to the May 2000 imbroglio. Although many believe that this issue will be resolved through negotiations, the prognostics are not that great. The Haitian Government keeps making concessions; the International Community via the OAS keep encouraging the parties to negotiate a settlement. However, based on the history of those negotiations that have gone on for more than two years, Haiti will only become more stable following new elections. If the electorate makes choices of candidates for legislative and municipal posts that are balanced. If there is an opposition party in Parliament that is non-obstructionist and pro-market, the country will begin to move on and the level of confidence in society at large and in the economic sector particularly will begin to grow.
Once that is accomplished, the Haitian Government will begin to receive loan money borrowed from international financial institutions like the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund. Larger businesses and foreign investors will begin to invest in Haiti. With greater stability, the economy will finally begin to take a turn for the better.
In any case, the likelihood of Haiti becoming more stable if the GOH and the opposition Convergence reach a political settlement is questionable at best. For that to happen, the Convergence leaders and their followers would have to consider the Lavalas party and its leader Aristide not necessarily as partners, but at least as political adversaries.
Presently, the appearance suggests that the Convergence tends to view Aristide and his political party as enemies. This implies logically, that they view Lavalas as a political machine that needs to be destroyed, not one to work with. Such a view does not translate into a possibility for these political foes to work with one another and reach compromise on legislations, administrative matters, and other important issues.
If elections are organized, are transparent, and are ratified and certified by the International Community, namely the United States, then the Convergence politicians will have to either "get into the game", or continue on along their same old lines. In either case, they would become irrelevant in the larger picture, especially if the GOH concurs with many of the desiderata of the International Community.
Many within the Convergence group could eventually defect as they would realize that there is no hope for them in maintaining an intransigent line. Hence, the Convergence as it is known would crumble all by itself while a more loyal opposition to the current régime would begin to take hold, to the long-tern benefit of the country.
It is thus clear that Haiti's economy and its political outlook are intimately intertwined. The picture of the last 15 years is very bleak. Yet, some things have been gained, and government must learn to capitalize on these gains. There are more small businesses in Haiti now than before, thanks to the Diaspora's dynamism. The economy is more diversified.
The banking industry that is mostly homegrown, has successfully demonstrated what savvy Haitian business people can do when they organize. With all those factors and many more subtle ones, government must learn to better administer, better focus on what works, better use statistical data to implement or devise policies, and continue on building up or creating sensible economic incentives that will assure greater prosperity for society at large. Otherwise, Civil Society will continue on losing steam, and Haiti will keep on losing its best and brightest to wealthier nations.
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