Haiti, a country of crises
By Hyppolite Pierre
On November 17, 2002, the Convergence opposition organized the largest demonstration yet, against the government of Jean-Bertrand Aristide. As more than 10,000 people stood up in the second most important historical city of the country and chanting anti-Aristide slogans, chill could have gone through the spine of any political analyst familiar with Haiti's history: the elite had finally gotten a popular voice.
Cap-Haïtien is indeed the city of Christophe. During his 13 years as the indisputable ruler of the North while based in that city, Christophe managed to build a royalty with splendor and glory. Most importantly, Christophe proved through his achievements there, that elitism is not contradictory to the noble goal of developing Haiti. It is also in that city that the elitists of Haiti had learned to gather their strength and effectively challenge Aristide, the man with the golden words according to his partisans, the man with the venomous tongue, according to his growing number of opponents and detractors.
The Aristide political adversaries did not see this moment as an opportunity to build a momentum that would help them challenge his Lavalas Party grip on the electorate. Instead, in a classic display of Haitian politics, they saw that moment as vital in their Gargantua-like appetite to get it all. They thus began to strategize the demise of their archenemy, the quintessential populist Jean-Bertrand Aristide.
When the seemingly impossible gets within reach
It all seemed an unlikely and an unattainable goal for the opposition, until the Lavalas régime of Jean-Bertrand Aristide started to make deadly mistakes. As partisans of the régime and Haitian political analysts had begun to suspect, something had gone terribly wrong between the time Aristide got back to power in 2001, and the year after. Hawks had taken over and had begun to control the whole process.
The moderates, inside and outside sympathizers of the Party, began as well to warn the government of being too cavalier in its approach, not focusing on the crucial issues that had propelled the Lavalas movement to its extraordinary height in the first place. Some even suggested back in November 2002, after the opposition demonstrations in Cap-Haïtien, that Aristide should have the courage to admit that he had failed in his approach. They suggested that he replaced his trusted Prime Minister Yvon Neptune, and the entire Cabinet with a politician more on his right, and less deferent towards him. He refused to consider such independent advices, and simply kept on riding the same vicious horse on the same road.
By the end of 2003, some foreign friends of the government began to wonder why many moderate figures that had supported Aristide in the past became mute on the matters of his vulnerability, and were no longer defending him. Kevin Pina for example, an American journalist who now resides in Haiti, wrote a text in The Black Commentator, a web publication, in which he asked that very question. Mr. Pina had perhaps failed to realize that these moderates' attachment to Aristide was based on a promise that he made.
It was never a personal attachment but a principled one, based on their then-belief that Aristide was the best hope in terms of helping the poor gain social and economic dignity. As he was failing in this project by virtue of his poor choices, and as they realized that they had no voice in the debate, they simply walked away from his project, which had by then become contradictory to the original goal.
The politics of scapegoat
Aristide in a bind was accusing the international community the whole time, of having imposed an economic embargo against him because they had refused to release more than half-a-billion dollars worth of loans that they had promised his government. Although many could see clearly that Aristide had other alternatives to keep the country on track, he was about to commit a capital sin. He began to accuse the French government of extorting 90 million old francs out of the Haitian people, as a result of a deal made in 1825 between then Haitian president Jean-Pierre Boyer, and the French Royalty of Charles X. He was therefore asking for the return of these millions with interest. This is a sum that, according to numbers put out by his people, is equivalent to nearly 22 billion US dollars in 2003 figure.
Instead of trying to find alternatives to get the Haitian economy moving, Aristide tried to find scapegoats – a classic Haitian political trait – to justify the shortcomings of his government. Just like the opposition claimed in 2000 that Lavalas had stolen the elections when the dispute was about 10 senatorial seats, Aristide was about to blame the French for his government's ineptitude. As the December 2003 reality proves it, this was a tragic mistake.
The results of alienating politics
The French, just like Haitian politicians who have learned from them, are master politicians. Angered by Aristide's continuous deceptive policies, they decided to quietly but firmly counterattack. But even before the French counterattack, there are some painful truths about these 90 million French francs stories that some Haitians refuse to reckon with.
On the one hand, there are historical documents which suggest that the Haitian president who made the Independence deal, Jean-Pierre Boyer, was the one who offered to negotiate with King Charles X of France. On the other hand, even if Charles X was indeed the aggressor, as he brought up not less than ten threatening warships in the waters of Haiti, Boyer had alternatives ways to defend Haiti at the time.
These events occurred at a time when the former slaves had earned their freedom for a little more than 20 years. Pétion gave them the possibility to purchase land at ridiculously low price. Their new possession, the land, represented their freedom and they would therefore fight hard to defend it against any potential Master, former or new, had they been given the opportunity.
Even more importantly, Boyer had achieved a cherished goal of many of his pre-Independence predecessors, including Toussaint Louverture, of unifying the entire island of Hispaniola (Haiti and present day Dominican Republic) so they could better defend Haiti at times of war. Finally, it was not even a decade since the Citadelle built by Christophe was complete. This was a fort, now recognized by the United Nations as a historical monument to humanity, built specifically by Christophe in order to defend Haiti in case of a French invasion. It is not reported that Boyer had even fired a single shot, not one shot from that mighty fortress.
Boyer was governing the entire island, including the North. He could have stood up to the French and fight back. The Citadelle had guns positioned towards the sea and all sides of the island in case an invading army tried to control Haiti and put the country back into slavery. To the dismay of some former generals of the Independence army, not a shot has been reported as having been fired against King Charles X invading army. Nothing of that sort was done. Instead, Boyer agreed to pay 150 million French francs to the French, an amount later reduced to 90 million.
How then does Aristide go from accusing the international financial institutions of imposing an embargo against his government, to asking the French for nearly 22 billion dollars, is the trillion dollars question. Even when the argument would or should be considered valid, it could have been framed differently and in a non-confrontational manner, perhaps even through quiet and diplomatic channels. Also, considering all the difficulties confronted by his government, Aristide is clearly the wrong president to even raise that issue.
Instead of taking responsibilities for the shortcomings of his own government, instead of learning how to use Haiti's largest bank in terms of economic and human resources, the Diaspora, he hired politically qualified but technically amorphous individuals, placed them in all sectors of government, and refused to listen to those who were telling him that his government was on the wrong track.
The truth is nevertheless, that the capital mistake was for him to launch a dreadful campaign against the French when he doesn't have the means to sustain such politics. The country is going through a very serious crisis of identity and many in the largely Francophile intellectual elite refuse to accept his "debt and reimbursement theory". It thus became easy for the French to rally them around. Worse, a new and apparently much less sympathetic American ambassador to Haiti, James Foley, had arrived. The opposition now had more sympathetic ears in different corners of the powerful international political spectrum while the economy is deteriorating. Haiti, a poor country, was about to experience something deadly.
The student movement
Even Aristide did not take the demonstrations seriously at first. In fact, he dismissed them at a press conference on December 10, 2003, as the work of a "small minority". Although they may not be the 100 percent that the opposition would want, Haitian politicians being excessive in their reach, it is a sizable group of mostly university students, business people, intellectuals, members of the traditional civil society (as civil society is conceived in Haiti) and other citizens from all walks of life, artists and all, that have gathered to denounce his régime.
Now that the opposition seems to have found its niche, as hungry as they are, they are less than willing to negotiate with Aristide's government. In fact, they had refused to negotiate with him when they had no political leg to stand on. The goal of the leaders of that movement is to not only overthrow the régime of Aristide but also, to expel him in the best-case scenario, or kill him if possible. That is indeed their true wish, as they are angry at the ultimate Haitian populist who had managed to keep them out of power for more than a decade.
The moderates
Many firm Lavalas believers, Haitians and foreigners, seem surprised that the moderates, especially those in the Diaspora, have refused to come out and defend the Lavalas régime. The stakes are indeed high, very high, and the survival of Aristide has so many important layers that one should not underestimate their cry for help.
On the one hand, it is a virtual certainty that should Aristide be removed from power, the next government will try to reestablish the dreaded Haitian army, just to "keep the people in check, in their rightful place".
This is perhaps why, despite the dire economic conditions of Haiti, more than ten thousand of these people had gathered on Friday, December 12, 2003, according to the Haitian weekly newspaper Haiti En Marche, in Port-au-Prince to defend the constitutionality of the Aristide régime.
These protesters were the victims of the army between 1991 and 1994. They had their sons and daughters, mothers and fathers raped and killed by the former army. Yet, many members of the opposition made it clear that should they get to power, they will make sure that the army is reinstituted.
It is that last gap, that lack of confidence in the opposition that is still holding Aristide by a firm thread. Should he really fall, Haiti would probably be a very, very deadly mess.
Those who are demonstrating still, for Aristide on the streets, are also genuinely concerned that they will no longer have a voice should Aristide fall. They perceive him to be and to always have been their last hope to have a voice in the system, although they now recognize that voice to be a corrupt one. Yet, the issues are very real.
Aristide has truly misused his political capital by staying too close to the hawks of his Party. Corruption is rampant, according to a Transparency International report published in the year 2003, that claims Haiti to be the third most corrupt country on their scale.
As if to make matters worse, the arrogance of some government workers has become notorious. They disrespect many moderates who cannot even get a simple answer from them about information that is or should be readily available, although it is their job to do so. The economy is in a frail shape at best. Aristide on the other hand, refuses to depoliticize vital issues for the nation in order to get the country going, and seems to only listen to the hawks in his régime.
Consequently, many intellectuals on the left and center-left, young and old who have supported him over the years are keeping their distance. They hope that he will survive for the very same reasons that the poor supporters of Aristide inside the country do. Yet, they feel humiliated at every level. The most potent example of such may be with the preparation of the 200th anniversary celebration of Haiti's Independence.
The Aristide government seems to have been preparing this 200-year anniversary of the country not to promote the cause of the Haitian people but as a show for international consumption first. The Diaspora feels like it is the poor child at the Party, while many Haitian artists and others who live in Haiti and could contribute to the celebration, have either pulled out of the celebration ceremony, or have not even been asked to participate. The frustration is real, although difficult for the government and its most fervent partisans to admit.
The struggle for power
The struggle is on, for power in Haiti. It seems as though it had never ended and never will. As though it is a visceral dislike for law and order, a cultural disease that keeps them from learning to respect each other's opinions, both sides are fighting again a deadly battle that can and will only weaken the State. Worse, they are doing so only a few days prior to the country's bicentennial, making sure that no matter what happens between December 2003 and January 2004, the world can once again laugh at the Haitian people as a people prone to failure.
What both sides in this battle seem to ignore, is that it is healthy, very healthy indeed for democracy to flourish in a society, to have two competing ideologies. In fact, this is the way it works in every major democratic country or aspiring democracy, from Israel to Germany to the United States to anywhere else where there is democracy.
Haiti's are the populist oriented Lavalas Party, and an elitist brand of political party that has yet to get its proper banner. The elitist ideal is there as it has always been, and is showing its strength as it must and should, but in a democratic context.
The elitist members of the opposition seem to think that getting rid of Aristide is the smartest thing to do. They may, with international help get their very wish concretized. In the process however, they are at least being embraced by individuals with shadowy past.
Dany Toussaint for instance, the all-powerful Lavalas Senator, who has joined their ranks, is at the very least an important witness in the murder of Haiti's most celebrated journalist, Jean Dominique. Perhaps fearing for his own skin, he has already declared his divorce with the Lavalas Party and the people who have propelled them to his current height. The opposition seems to have even embraced him.
Any hope?
The price of not letting Aristide finish his term and thus helping to reinforce the democratic process in Haiti may be so dire, that even today's staunchest opponents of his may cry out tomorrow for his return, if he had not been killed by then. If one thing is very clear at this point, it is that should the opposition gather its strength and build on its current momentum, it would or will represent a formidable challenge to the Lavalas Party in legislative elections, and most definitely the presidential elections still officially scheduled for November 2005.
As Haitian politics has always been defined by its tendency towards excess, any such suggestion is probably regarded by the opposition as invalid and even ridiculous. In order to arrive at such a solution however, certain things need to be done.
First, Aristide himself must realize that he can no longer govern under the same pattern. He would therefore have to work with his opponents, encouraged by the international community, so they can have a consensual government with the opposition having a much greater role than he would be willing to give them. By giving out so much, he would also need the guarantee that he will finish out his term, and that he can assure his personal, physical safety.
As the opposition would be in the circle of power, the much awaited electoral commission CEP could be finally constituted, and legislative and municipal elections could take place. At that point, the international community would need to have a much heavier hand in the process to ensure that both sides adhere to their engagement. Civil society at that point would perhaps begin to reemerge and even flourish.
Unfortunately, both sides still believe that they can and will outsmart each other. The sad truth is that with or without Aristide, with or without the current leaders of the opposition, neither side can nor will monopolize the process for long. They have tried the same for nearly two centuries and have eventually, constantly and consistently failed. Instead, they have constantly and consistently reverted to demonizing their opponents, and simply thrive in chaos to the detriment of all Haitians, including themselves.
The opposition and the government have yet to realize that politics is not religion. Each side either has or pretends to have its high priests whose logic is not only valid but has also the value of biblical words. Yet, the reality of politics indicate that political formulae only work so far as they are based on reason and flexibility.
For Haiti to become democratic the old practices, of overthrowing government because one side or the other is dissatisfied, must end. After all, it is a virtual certainty that should the Democratic Party in the United States call upon the hard core Bush-haters, they could descend upon the District of Columbia with more than five million people day and night, every day, and demand the president's resignation. Still, this would not bode well to the democratic ideas and ideals of the United States. It would instead be a tragic display of vile populism.
Haitians have to learn the same, although they are quite reluctant to do so. As they are failing to realize how dangerous radical politics is, they should compare what has happened in the Philippines since the fall of President Ferdinand Marcos, to what had been going on in Haiti since around the same time.
Seventeen years ago in February 1986, two peoples got rid of their respective dictators: the Filipinos got rid of the late Ferdinand Marcos, but eventually even accepted his wife to return home a few years later; the Haitian people got rid of Baby Doc Duvalier, and have been fighting for power ever since. If the Philippines have made minor and major progress in some respects, it is because they have stayed the course and have kept their emotions in check in pursuit of a greater and more noble goal. If the Haitian people have so far failed in their nation building project, it is because of radicalism, the refusal to compromise, and the personalization of issues that have very little if anything to do with individuality. Aristide is a product of Haitian history, the same way that the opposition is. Yet, they seem unable to realize and admit this simple fact.
It is clear that neither side in this struggle for power can fully and completely outsmart the other. The government can get a temporary respite until the opposition gathers strength again and start all over. The opposition can overthrow the Aristide government, just to create the right conditions for someone even worse than François Duvalier to surprisingly reemerge on the political scene, at the least anticipated moment.
They may sadly realize so only when under the gun and about to get executed, that to get rid of Aristide, they had associated themselves with political devils who will use the Aristide "misadventure" as an important lesson, so as not to be overridden. This is how after all, Duvalier used the "Estimé" lesson of 1950, to practically destroy all hopes for Haiti for nearly 50 years now.
Hyppolite Pierre is author of a first book on Haiti, due out soon, and entitled Haiti, rising flames from burning ashes.
