Breaking the logjam: a controversial suggestion (Part 1)
By Hyppolite Pierre
It has been close to 3 years since Haiti is at an impasse resulting from the May 2000 elections. If anything is clear at this point, it is that things are not about to change for the better overnight.
The Convergence opposition is well oiled with logistical support from organizations in the United States like the International Republican Institute. Moreover, Haiti a very poor country, is dealing with a republican administration that is every bit determined to see that "things don't work". Their no longer so secret goal is to justify the eventual fall of the present government by showing or proving that it cannot work.
On the other hand, the government of Haiti is every bit amorphous as to how to bypass some of the current difficulties so economic progress can take place at a decisive pace, despite all the roadblocks put in front of their administrative wheels. This is so true that rather than trying to find creative ways to foster greater flows of income in the economy, they are constantly and consistently begging the international financial institutions to release funds so they could implement developmental projects that are nevertheless vital for a stronger economy.
Not one individual for instance who works for the current government has discussed, at least publicly, ways to incite more small entrepreneurs or would-be-entrepreneurs in the Diaspora to come and invest in the economy. Worse, Haiti's perhaps last hope, the very small pool of university educated Haitians who still live there, are only hoping for an exit visa after graduation, to countries with greater opportunities like the United States and Canada.
It is indeed not much of a surprise that during the past few years, so many young university graduates have left for Canada. Their consulate has become according to many, actively engaged in encouraging young and educated men and women from Haiti, to apply for an exit visa to go and live there. Still, we should keep in mind that there should be no moral outrage in regards to this issue, since we're only dealing here with the law of supply and demand.
What should the Haitian government do, against these difficulties? Most of those who are opposed to it, keep on suggesting that the government and the country's president should resign at once. However attractive such a solution seems to them, it is probably the wrong one in the larger sphere of things.
An important, yet conveniently forgotten, historical precedent
This current period in Haiti's history is of great importance for those who care about the future of that nation. It is so for many different reasons.
On the one hand, one needs to recognize that ever since Haiti has gotten rid of Duvalier in 1986, it has tried with very limited success, to transform itself from a dictatorship to a democracy. The reasons are rooted in the country's history itself.
Haiti is essentially a country that is totally unfamiliar with coalition government. It is a place where winners take all, and losers go hide under the table by leaving the country, or are simply killed. This political culture can be dated back to at least 1806, only 2 years and a few months following the country's independence. At that time indeed, after Christophe and Pétion had plotted to kill the leader of the independence, Dessalines, they had to divide the country into two, simply because they could not agree on a governing formula. Pétion at the time, had proposed a governing formula to Christophe that would have reduced his margin of power significantly, at least in the short while. The latter refused to govern that way, went to war against Pétion who expected it anyway. When he lost, Haiti became divided into two territories. This is probably the strongest argument that explains Haiti's notoriety for political intransigence.
That precedent is pivotal in understanding why Haitians have always been unable to govern through reasonable and healthy compromises. The best formula for compromise under such historical precedent is the one often used whereby, a tiny minority from the defunct administration manages to "join in" into the party, if allowed. This is how for example one can account for the presence of some notable Duvalierists and others from previous administrations like the current Minister of Justice in Haiti.
It is against that background that the Organization of American States (OAS) has been trying to negotiate an end to the post-electoral crisis (May 2000 elections) between the Lavalas government and the Convergence opposition. This negotiating process has been so slow, that it has angered and even discouraged some of the truest friends of Haiti in the international community.
Granted, had the Convergence opposition not been receiving logistical support from foreign governments or institutions, the crisis would have probably been already resolved long ago. That resolution however would probably not have been a peaceful one. The Convergence opposition group would have been literally crushed in the worst way, by zealots from Aristide's Fanmi Lavalas, or perhaps by Aristide himself. Just to make sure that no one gets illusory in regards to Haiti's political process, the Convergence would have done exactly the same had the coin been in the other side's hands.
From that perspective, it is perhaps not as bad as many Lavalas partisans and others suggest it, all in good faith, that the international community is so involved in resolving this crisis. The international community and especially the OAS, in that sense, is perhaps the guarantor, the ultimate judge that is still keeping both sides away from the warring sphere.
On the other hand, putting all conspiracy theories aside and simply dealing with the facts, it is still some members of that same international community that have contributed to the "stalling" of the negotiation process. The OAS for instance has brought up a resolution recently, Resolution 822, which clearly defined the parameters for Haiti to move forward through elections. It has even included in the body of their text that if a party refuses to participate in the formation of the Electoral Council, that 5 other groups from Civil Society that had already chosen their representative may elect the "missing" representative by consensus.
Yet, after more than 2 months of that declaration in 2002, the CEP cannot be constituted. The reason advanced now is albeit legitimate, inconsistent with the reality of Haiti. If the Haitian government is as broke as it claims to be –and we have every reason to believe that it is- there is no way that they will be able to adhere to the prerequisites of the OAS unless the OAS itself becomes intrinsically involved in the process.
Meanwhile, it is also clear that only through negotiations and the formation of a coalition government, that Haiti will begin to move along for the better. What then are the alternatives?
The mistakes of the "Option zero"
The first option suggested by the opposition since the May 2000 elections, is the option zero. It is an option that at first suggested the redoing of all the parliamentary and municipal elections, all at once. That option also suggests now, new presidential elections without Aristide in the game.
Now that Aristide is in power, it has become the unofficial but very real option espoused by the republican administration in the United States, the Convergence opposition since they think it would benefit them, some Haitian business leaders, a few but vociferous Haitian intellectuals from the far right and the ultra left in Haiti and in the Diaspora.
Those groups and organizations, and also those individuals should not forget that Aristide was indeed elected for a 5-year mandate, in a presidential election in November 2000. They may call it selection but his mandate is for 5 years. Moreover, putting all passion aside and however painful that truth may be to many, Aristide is at least the most recognizable politician in Haiti, if not and even most probably still the most popular.
Searching for a leader, the Convergence opposition dilemma
The sad truth is that the largest opposition group in Haiti, the Convergence, made a tragic strategic mistake by not participating in the presidential elections in November 2000. The right course of action would have been for them to have sent at the time a presidential candidate, although it was clear at the time that such would have lost. They would have at least participated in the electoral process. Instead, they steadfastly refused to engage in the process, boycotting it by calling it a sham, and that prior refusal is now so costly to them. The reasons behind that logic are simple.
Although it was clear that they would have lost, had they at least resigned themselves to participate in the process, and had their candidate communicated correctly the "risks" involved for the country in electing Aristide as president, they would have begun back then to set up the backbone of an argument which they could have been using since after his elections when the problems began. They would have thereby, built a credible rapport with the Haitian electorate.
Even more importantly, that opposition leader from the Convergence would have been able to credibly and effectively argue today that the electorate was forewarned. Finally, such an individual would have been today the uncontestable leader of the Convergence opposition. Their level of trustworthiness would have therefore increased today.
Unfortunately today, partly because of that mistake, the opposition does not have a clear leader who can stand up to Aristide as a viable challenger, someone that the Haitian electorate can trust for directions in this difficult period. The Convergence opposition is consequently always titillating, searching for someone whom the population trusts enough to encourage them to get rid of Aristide.
Everyone thought at one point that, Gérard Gourgue was the leader of the Convergence opposition. They even chose him as such on February 7, 2001, and had separate investiture ceremony for him while the world and most of Haiti was focused on Aristide as the new legitimate president of Haiti for the next 5 years.
Leslie François Manigat, a Haitian scholar in his own right, thought for long that he would eventually become the Convergence leader due to his intellectual stature. Once he realized that he would never become so, he parted his own way and created a new coalition movement called l'Union Patriotique, headed by himself with his wife as the next in charge.
Nowadays, it is in all appearance a former member of the dreaded and defunct military, colonel Himmler Rébu, who is the Convergence leader. He is a participant in all demonstrations and has even been accused of shooting at counter demonstrators in the Lavalas camp. Former colonel Rébu is a man with a shady past as leader of the utterly feared Corps des Léopards, a military unit created for and by Baby Doc when he was president of Haiti.
It is safe to say that the Convergence does not truly have an identifiable and credible leader. Yet, that opposition group has remain steadfast in its request that Aristide, and all elected members of Parliament and municipality leave power for good. That's the zero option.
Part of that request has been satisfied when all members of Parliament had agreed to cut their mandate by 2 years. This is what brings us to the electoral issue today. Still, short of Aristide resigning, all members of Haiti's municipal councils, and all other individuals from the Lavalas camp being purged from the power structure, the Convergence seems reluctant to move even one inch away from their reticence.
Some call that attitude, fear. They are aware it is suggested, that should Aristide still be on the political landscape as a player or even in the shadows, he can still command the population if not manipulate the electoral process to the benefit of his Lavalas party. In fact, this may be attributing too much power to one individual in the largest scheme of things. A credible electoral process may prove that they are wrong.
Others perhaps more cynical, suggest instead that the opposition just wants to share the pie among their members, as though Haiti was a big cake that every politician should simply come and relish. Perhaps the truth is a bit simpler. The opposition is still in the mode of political dichotomy: they are good and Lavalas is bad; therefore, Lavalas should pack and go, all at once.
A more complex reality
A look at events starting on November 17, 2002, suggests a reality perhaps a bit more complex. The truth is now, that Lavalas no longer controls the entire political space. The opposition is beginning to show strength, which is good for democracy in the short and long run. However, the opposition mishandled that first series of success by asking outright for the removal of Aristide as Haiti's president. It is that rush in conclusion that explains perhaps best the events that ensued.
When the opposition began to request the removal of Aristide for power, they chose as their leader, as indicated previously, Himmler Rébu. Yet, the memory of the dreaded military is still fresh in the minds of many. Thousands indeed died at their hand, and countless others were misplaced during the coup years 1991-1994.
The Lavalas apparatus afterwards called on its troops and many more people showed up than could have been anticipated because of the psychological fear brought about by this initial success of the opposition. Since then, Aristide has skillfully played the game of participating in inaugurals in regions of the country like the South, where he gives speeches that albeit moderate to some degree, are also reminiscent from other angles of how Haiti is still a divided society. During one of these speeches, he made reference to the issue of color (blacks vs. mulattoes), that have angered many mostly from the traditional ruling class. His speeches are nevertheless, still electrifying to the so many poor who continue on relishing in the idea of "Titid".
The Convergence opposition is not about to fall asleep on the other hand. For every semblance of a crisis in the system, financial or otherwise, they try to capitalize on it by trying to create their final and revered, dreamed impact: the overthrow of Aristide and his party.
Despite all those demonstrations, staged or otherwise by both sides, although the consensus is clear on the side of the traditional ruling class, it is not so within the core population at large (the masses as they like to call them), for Aristide to leave power, and also leave the country as this would require in the tradition of Haitian politics. This is not 1986 when the consensus was very clear on all sides: Baby Doc Duvalier had to go.
Today, the electorate may be mistrusting of Jean-Bertrand Aristide and his government. They are however suspicious of the opposition. The masses are concerned for the meager democratic gains that they have been able to accomplish. Moreover, Aristide and his administration have argued with limited success to the population that the international community refuses to make good on its promises of releasing borrowed funds to the government because of the Convergence.
The frustration
Aristide meanwhile has at least been perceived to be the one always willing to make concessions to the other side. He had agreed for instance with the OAS to cut by two years, the mandate of all elected leaders except his own. He had consistently spoken a conciliatory language on the public scene, towards the Convergence. Yet, the Convergence is still not even clear as to whether they consider Aristide's presidency as legitimate. In fact, they have always indicated otherwise with their action. They for instance chose a "symbolic" president on February 7, 2001, as Aristide was being sworn in as the new leader of the country.
Many more people in the local population than the Convergence believes, or is led to believe, regard the opposition's political attitude as at best suspicious, and are not sure whether there would again be reprisals against them, just like 1991, in case Aristide would have to leave. Those most vulnerable to reprisals under such scenario still have fresh memories of the aftermath of the September 1991 coup. Worse, by relying on Rébu as their new, perhaps interim political leader at the demonstrations, the Convergence made the tactical mistake of leaving many with at least the perception that they could or even would be repressive should they become the new leaders of the country.
It is in that context perhaps that one should first consider the massive number of people who were and are still willing to demonstrate on behalf of Lavalas. It is not necessarily because they still share the same faith in Lavalas as they did from 1990 through 1997.
An even more important issue is being sidelined in this debate. Haiti is a country with a peaceful civil society, but a rather violent political culture. Here is perhaps a potent example.
The potential threat from the possible success of the opposition's "zero option"
When in the early 1950's, the moderate Dumarsais Estimé lost power by a coup from the military associated with the traditional holders of power in the bourgeoisie, Papa Doc Duvalier was in the wings. Probably angered by this deed, he kept silent and waited in the shadows until he managed to become president in 1957. He played the political chessboard until he was sure he was in control. Once he achieved that first goal, he became atrociously violent. That violence was and still is painful to many who lived through it, to even recount. That violence was the direct result of his refusal to be dictated, to be used, and to be played by the traditional political class so eager to keep its privileges intact.
Haiti is once again, slowly but surely tilting towards this vicious side. If the parties at odds manage to agree to some form of a reasonable compromise, hopes may become high once again that perhaps forever, Haiti has left behind its decadent past. For better or worse, it is a fact that Aristide himself has made many offers to an opposition, which is still in the "refusal" mood. Although he had been forced to make them, this is truly unprecedented in Haiti's political history that a head of state is willing to concede to an opposition that does not seem to have any solid popular base or support.
Sadly enough, no one knows who is once again, like François Duvalier, hiding in the shadows, and counting Aristide's offers as childish and worthless because the opposition refuses to meet him even by an inch along the way.
That particular "imaginary" for now, individual, is the biggest threat to Haiti's long-term goal of peace and stability, not Aristide. Should Aristide fail, that person who may be from either side, may manage to play the game of being a puppet of the traditional political class, and win the presidency. Once president and in control, that person may have everyone -from Haitians to those members of the international community- think of Duvalier as a modern day Saint.
Haiti because of its past, the thirst for raw power of traditional politicians, and the quite recent François Duvalier precedent, is capable of producing a new version of Pol Pot in the Caribbean sea. The question therefore becomes, whether the international community would be willing to help Haiti as so many of them seem willing to do so today.
It is therefore clear, at least based on precedence and the need for Haitians to learn to govern through consensus, that the option zero as being pushed by the opposition and their allies is the wrong option for Haiti. There must be also a way to amicably end that electoral logjam. How then do you do to resolve the crisis?
