Breaking the logjam: a controversial suggestion (Part 2)
A Possible Solution
By Hyppolite Pierre
One thing must remain clear to all parties as a matter of principle, as well as practicality. The one man, one vote mantra must be safeguarded against all odds. No political grouping from the left or the right should have the priority of undoing what took the majority of Haitians more than a century to accomplish: a clear voice in the administration of the res publica. Achieving that goal in the present context is however difficult.
When on December 16, 1990, under the watchful eyes of the world through the United Nations, the Haitian people elected for the first time a new Parliament and president, it was the result of a long struggle that had left many heads and bodies behind, in dumpsters, in cemeteries, and in all sorts of other repositories. Had Marc Bazin for instance, the front runner in these elections until Aristide became a candidate, been elected that day as president of Haiti, the effect would have been the same, for the Haitian people would have at long last made it clear that they now have a voice in the process. Aristide was then elected.
Since then, the political process had been entangled in that new equation where political actors do not really know for sure where they stand. Unfortunately for those who had never before had the opportunity to be part of the political process, they have adversaries who are quite willing and able to derail the process, rather than correcting it. From that perspective, the fight for Aristide to finish his term is not a fight for Aristide per se. It is rather a fight for the integrity of democracy, and the respect of the rule of law in an eventually better Haiti.
How one achieves this simple but yet pivotal goal is perhaps a more complex matter. Not one group from the left or the right can govern Haiti on its own. The proof, as they say, is in the pudding. Despite the fact that for example, still in early 2003, 80 percent of the elected politicians are from the Lavalas camp, Aristide is unable to break through as he wishes, for a better Haiti, or perhaps even, to the detriment of Haiti. We don't know and will probably never know for sure, because he and his government are constantly under all kinds of guns.
Haiti however must move on. What is then again, the right formula? Should he resign because, business leaders demand that he be removed? Should he resign because as some on the far right suggest, he is mentally incompetent? Should he resign because as some ultra left-wingers claim, he betrayed "their" causes? Or should he be allowed to finish his term, and resolve the electoral issue through elections?
After all, the issues that are being debated are not a resultant of the November 2000 elections that brought him reelections. They are rather the results of miscounting for 10 senators during the May 2000 elections. This issue had been resolved, although unsatisfactorily to the opposition.
The Convergence opposition refuses so far to go to elections, because they are afraid that they may not win with an Aristide still in the wing. They are probably correct. Aristide therefore must find ways to give the opposition positive assurances.
Then again, Aristide made another faux-pas during the weekend of January 11, 2003, by meeting with two members of the Convergence Directory, in secret and hosted by the Catholic Church, unbeknownst to the others. He must act through transparency the next time, for hopefully there will be one.
His faux-pas was in his approach to resolve the logjam since the year 2000. He wanted to choose a member of the Convergence Directory, Serges Gilles, as the new Prime Minister of Haiti in replacement to his current right-hand man, Prime Minister Yvon Neptune.
Although Gilles is a member of the Convergence hierarchy, it is a virtual certainty that the other members of that organization would not have agreed with that decision because it would have been made behind their back. Aristide must first find ways to convince the majority from that group's hierarchy to sit down and talk to him, with the entire world and the Haitian people knowing in large part, what proposals he will make.
Once he does so, and after having tested that proposal through public reaction, he should go on himself and discuss the details with them, in all transparency. He now is lucky enough to have the support of one powerful institution, the Catholic Church.
The Catholic Church's representatives in Haiti, who had been the most opposed to Aristide's leadership in 1991, seem to have made some sort of peace with him. In fact, back in 1991, the Vatican was the only foreign government to have exchanged diplomatic mission with the soldiers' régime headed by general Cédras. The Catholic hierarchy had recently, given a symbolic check of $5,000 US to the OAS so the latter can manage some of its expenses incurred in the matter of Haiti. Now that the Catholic Church is actively engaged and willing to be a go-between in the negotiations process, there should be some ways to encourage that institution along those lines.
The first proposal
One of the most severe victims of this logjam is the Lavalas party, not the opposition. Yet, Lavalas has to make most of the concessions because, they are in control of all the State's institutions. They have to despite all the frustration that may be coming from that camp. Aristide should therefore make the first gesture.
Forming a new government perhaps even under the leadership of the opposition may be the first and even most important step to make. Although the opposition is referring to the precedent coalition government in March of 1999 as a failure, they should recognize that they are as much to blame for that failure as they claim that Lavalas is. The reason for this particular conclusion is clear.
The opposition argues that back in 1999, the Lavalas government had "fooled" them when they had them join in the government. What they are not saying is, that by leaving the government during that time, they in effect gave a free hand to Lavalas to do how they wished in terms of fully organizing their way, the elections of May 2000. Had they stayed and fought from within, those mistakes that they claim, would simply not have occurred or would have but at a lesser degree. You cannot leave on a table all the pie, and then complain later on that someone else who is hungry and sitting at that table ate it all. They must therefore be committed to stay within the governmental structure and fight from within.
If the opposition is really serious about a new democratic government, they must be ready to join in that government to have a clear and proactive eye in the process of organizing the next parliamentary and municipal elections. Once they do, then other proposals can be put on the table.
The difficult suggestion
Unless the Convergence opposition knows for sure that they will be able to share power with Lavalas after the elections, they will not be willing to participate. They will go on with their strategy of boycotting the political process, with the blessing of powerful and well-financed institutions in Haiti and abroad. Meanwhile, the country will continue on decaying. Yet, if Lavalas leaves power all together, the long term for Haiti is not as bright as all the Lavalas and Aristide haters seem to think. Aristide therefore has to make a bold gesture to not bring peace to Haiti, but to advance the struggle in a more positive way.
After the formation of a new government with opponents and even adversaries of the régime, the negotiations for the modality of the next elections must be worked upon quickly and firmly. Aristide should therefore make a proposal along those lines.
Under all circumstances, the opposition would be ensured that they would have anywhere between 25 and 35 percent of the electorate for the next elections. This is indeed a difficult proposition but one worth consideration. This is perhaps how it could work best.
If we work with the 35 percent figure for instance, Lavalas would agree to only send candidates throughout the country, so they could win a maximum of 65 percent of the electorate. The opposition on the other hand would have a guarantee that no matter what, they would at least have 35 percent of the parliamentary and municipal seats, plus whatever else they can get from the 65 percent that Lavalas would be competing to get. Under that scenario, Lavalas could only get a maximum of 65 percent while the opposition could get theoretically, all 100 percent of the electorate, or at least 35 percent of those elective posts.
As an example, let us consider the city of Petit-Goâve which has recently been a center of opposition demonstrations. Because the Convergence seems to be so entrenched in the electorate in that town, the Lavalas apparatus could decide to only send candidates for CASEC and other municipal posts, so they could only gain 65 percent of the posts if all of their candidates win. On the other hand, the opposition could send candidates so they could win the entire 100 percent electoral positions.
Overall however, the equation must be calculated in such a way that there is always a healthy opposition to whichever party that has a majority in that town, municipality, or whatever else. Thus, both sides would begin to truly learn through the reality on the political landscape the process of compromises.
As it is right now, Haitian political culture seems to have some form of natural aversion for compromise, an essential component of crafting and effective modern state in a democratic atmosphere. Decisions at all levels of government would be taken by consensus, as they are taken in any democracy, because all parties would have a clear, definite, and real voice in the decision making process.
However wrong such an accord may seem to many, it is perhaps the only, most reasonable, and most viable way to teach Haitians all together to stop thinking of politics simply in terms of dichotomy. As it is right now, everyone thinks in terms of right, and wrong. I am right, and you are wrong. Yet, when one talks to both sides, they have much more in common in terms of ways to develop the country than they apparently believe.
Keeping the integrity of the one man, one vote process
This agreement would not in any way violate the basic principle of one man, one vote. It would not because, everyone would have the chance to make his or her voice heard in the process. It would somehow level the playing field in a way that would at least on the surface, benefit the opposition much more than Lavalas. However, it would break the logjam in a way that would be satisfactory in the long run to everyone.
After all, the Lavalas base, angered by such an approach to the electoral process, could even be reenergize to go to the voting booth, and vote for Lavalas candidates so they could ensure that Lavalas still has a workable majority in parliament. The opposition would on the other hand, encourage its own base to make sure that they go and vote en masse, just to make sure that they become the majority against what they call, the all-too-powerful Lavalas government.
The opposition on the other hand would have to make a major concession. As it is now, their concern is also that if they go to elections, and Aristide has the right and possibility to campaign for his partisans, they cannot win. They therefore have no incentives whatsoever to go to elections which would confirm their demise.
The opposition under such a plan, would have to agree that Aristide campaign vigorously for the candidates from his party. After all, he usually is able to deliver the goods, and going along with such a plan would represent a major risk for him personally, and his party in particular to lose power for a long time.
The OAS and its role under such a plan
The OAS would have to become under such a plan, a very active and important partner for the Haitian people. They would have to ensure that there be no possibilities for fraud from either side. This is also why it is so crucial to have a coalition government, prior to having such elections. Both sides could therefore check each other, as the OAS would become an important and impartial judge.
The OAS would also have to define how one side or the other can or could challenge the results of the elections over all, and under what circumstances. It is simply tiring to deal with Haitian politicians from all sides crying foul play every time they lose, without substantive proof.
What the OAS would also have to do, is to make sure that in each and every polling station, each side has a minimum number of poll watchers. As it is right now, unless you have a trustworthy international arbiter, Haitian politicians will always argue forcefully that they lost vote or the elections because the other side "stole" them.
The current situation
Currently in Haiti, the opposition is using all its resources to not go to elections. They would prefer the overthrow of the government because they suspect that they may not be able to win unless Lavalas is gone from the political landscape. Their strategy which had changed so often in the past, seems to be in trying to build a momentum through daily or weekly demonstrations, just like in Venezuela, that will eventually create that final "spur" so Lavalas and Aristide can go for good. It is a wrong strategy but one that is supported not so covertly by the International Republican Institute and its institutional allies in Haiti.
One of these institutions' recent tactic, is to try to build up support in the Diaspora for the overthrow of Aristide. They are trying to do so by suggesting that once Aristide is gone, they will make sure that enough cadre from the Diaspora get the opportunity to return back home, and work towards the development of Haiti.
They can play that game because Aristide and his government have failed to do anything substantial for a Diaspora that has for the large part, mostly been on their side. The opposition and allies may be serious about doing so, should Aristide fail. However, there is no guarantee that it would happen and even if they did so, it would probably not be done the way they claim they would.
There are many reasons for this conclusion and we will not get into the details here. Nevertheless, it is the correct conclusion.
As to the demonstrations strategy of the opposition
The government should remain calm, and give the demonstrators all the logistical support to ensure that their demonstrations take place in calm and order. In any case, this is a strategy that will most likely fail, no matter how often it is tried and repeated. The only sensible way to resolve the current crisis in Haiti is through elections. To have elections however, Lavalas will have to make even more concessions than they already have, as we tried to explain it here.
Although this is quite early in the year 2003, Haiti will celebrate its bicentennial next year. It would be such a shame and such a sad moment in the country's history if all its children did not have the opportunity to celebrate. Time is running much faster than both sides seem to realize. Yet, the hope for and the work toward a better Haiti should be all Haitians' primary concern. The time of and for intransigent politics must end. Haitians must now realize that the only way they can build a modern state is through tolerance, and respect for the other side.
Haiti is a country in a struggle for peace. Should such a solution get a nod from both sides, it would be a major positive development. It would not however bring peace to the country. Peace means stability. It also means that we no longer as a people, have to devise ways to create a space for the other side because they have built upon this possibility to become positively engaged in the democratic process. Peace means that Haitians can have hope in the future of their country. Peace means a lot than just resolving this particular issue at one time. After all, if such a solution would be agreed upon by all sides, it should not be repeated more than once, because it is an artificial defect that everyone is trying to correct.
