Haiti, will reason and logic finally prevail?
By Hyppolite Pierre
The week of November 17, 2002 marked a pivotal shift in the political configuration of Haiti. Finally, after months and even years of effort by the opposition to undermine the Lavalas régime headed by Jean-Bertrand Aristide, they've succeeded.
Their success is due primarily to the tragic mistakes of the régime by not having agreed in May 2000 to have a second tour for a few would-be Senators who were ahead already in the electoral battle, when they were asked to do so.
Background for the first difficulties
As it is now well-known as a Haitian political trait, the winners wanted to take it all and in the process this time, undermined their own power. The arithmetic at the time indicated, that had the Lavalas power structure agreed with the suggestions of Orlando Marville (then head of the Electoral Council watchdog of the Organization of American States in Haiti), to send those Senators for a second tour, they would have still had a working majority in Parliament. Even more importantly, there were to be senatorial elections again in November 2000 for the remaining senators in Parliament. Lavalas at that time would have probably gotten at least five of their partisans elected, as they would be riding on the coattails of a then very popular former president who was running once again for office. That would have ensured the possibility for the Executive branch to pass most of its constitutional amendments, from accomplishing Aristide's personal goal of abolishing the army, to ensuring duo-citizenship for the Diaspora, to a host of other things.
But if in Haitian politics winner-take-all is the dominant attitude, losers never admit either to their loss so they can better prepare for next time. If they can't win or haven't won, they will ensure that you are unable to govern. As the international community was still demanding for Lavalas to send those Senators for a second round, the opposition began to run up the idea that the elections overall were neither good nor fair. They claimed massive fraud, although most fair analysts agree that if fraud there was, it was only limited and such claims should be accompanied with specificity.
The Lavalas leader Aristide then began to feel that the tide was turning against him and his party, and agreed to negotiate with the opposition now regrouped under a single mantra called the Convergence. They stalled the process very effectively, encouraged by the elections of George W. Bush in the United States, and a French government – thus the European Union itself- increasingly uncomfortable with Aristide and his political style. The Convergence refused to integrate the government while Lavalas began to make the kinds of concessions that should have been made months before. Aristide finally convinced seven contentious Senators to resign just so the negotiating process could advance.
Meanwhile, the economy began to deteriorate. Scandal after scandal began to even ruin Aristide's political base, the poor. A seemingly good effort to alleviate the hunger problems that plague Haiti through the purchase of Haiti's favorite starch, rice, was hurt by a corruption scandal attached to it. The government, desperate to get involved in big projects that are costly, focused its attention on getting borrowed funds from the IMF and the Inter American Development Bank (IDB). To get that money into the public treasury coffers, the Haitian government may have already spent a few millions, mostly by paying foreign lobbyists who seem to date, unable to get these institutions to release any funds because of the United States' implicit refusal.
Many Haitian supporters of the régime abroad, concerned with the behind-the-scenes stories of corruption, disorganized government, and the apparent inability to accomplish simple projects, or meet limited goals refused to raise their voice in the debate. They instead began to suggest that government should first put its house in order, work towards ending impunity, and focus on small reachable alternatives like encouraging small business Diaspora investment and Diaspo-Tourism for instance, as other ways to circumvent their financial difficulties. The last blow for the moderates in Haiti and the Diaspora, most of them former Lavalas ardent supporters, was the cooperatives scandal.
The end of all confidence
When Aristide became president, he made it at the core of his agenda to encourage investment in cooperatives so the economy could work better. This was and still is an excellent idea which, if properly managed could help move the economy in although limited but more prosperous grounds.
Some officials of government including the then and now head of the opposition group Movement for the Instauration of Democracy in Haiti (MIDH), Marc Bazin, suggested while he was in government that the rules of the game should be clearly defined before engaging in the cooperatives projects. He suggested legislations, regulations that would take all risks and potentials into account so the system itself could not be abused by crooks or thieves. The Lavalas leadership refused to go along with his ideas and next came up the very issues that Bazin's suggestions were trying to annihilate. By the end it was discovered that many so-called cooperatives were nothing but a pyramid scheme. Many people invested at first, as they were yielding very high returns. When finally people began to lose their money, the government tried to do what they were told would happen. They did legislate on the cooperatives issue but it was too little too late, as thousands lost their initial investment, thus the growing chorus of Lavalas haters in Civil Society.
Faced with a dire situation and concerned about the political backlash, the government at first suggested that they would pay back to the investors every single one of their pennies. Fortunately, thanks to economists like Kesner Pharel of Groupe Croissance who called the idea risky and explain that it would deplete the entire public treasury, the government retracted and decided instead to only pay a portion of their money to these sour investors.
Too many mistakes in too short a time
The basic problem that seems to have plagued Aristide and his government was that they've made too many mistakes in too short a time. Worse, all their mistakes could have been avoided, had they listened to the arguments of people trained in the field in which decisions were being made, rather than focusing on politics and doing what is mostly expedient, instead of correct.
This problem is serious enough for many to keep wondering whether Lavalas and the political class in general, will ever work towards modernizing the State, rather than always working to get to power, and hold on to that power.
The consequences have been devastating for society's confidence level in government. Many people from modest means who were timid supporters of Lavalas in the country began to grumble. The stories of corruption kept on resonating more and more in the media and all other circles, and the government perhaps too arrogant, never tried to respond to these accusations.
As doubts about the government's capacity to deal with serious economic and other issues kept on increasing, the Executive branch kept on making bad political moves by showing clearly their influence on the judiciary. At first it was with a former president who took over power in the late 1980's, Prosper Avril. A human rights violator, he was sued in the United States by now some members of the opposition after he had lost power in early 1990, and moved to Florida. After they had won their judgment against him, he returned to Haiti rather than paying his dues. Finally last year, the Haitian government had him arrested.
Now that Lavalas and the president himself are the archenemy of the opposition, in traditional Haitian politics, they all agreed to not file charges against Prosper Avril. Some of them instead even suggested that he be released. A judge late Spring or early Summer 2002, ordered Avril's release. So he was… Until before he was immediately re-arrested for other "pending" charges. At that point, it seemed as though the Haitian government was surely playing Russian roulette.
For a government that was under so many mounting pressures and problems, this was a tragic new mistake. Yet, no one seems to have had the courage in government to tell the president of the danger and the potential backlash with such tactics. They do not even seem to have discussed the resulting public relations blunder.
In late October 2002, another judge ordered Avril's release once again, because the new charges were invalid. For him to be released, the judge in Port-au-Prince who had originally filed those charges against him would have to declare those charges null and void. That judge refused, and it looked clearly that it was because of political pressure from the Executive branch.
Total loss of confidence
Lavalas at that point had no more confidence of the poor, those from modest means, the middle class, and certainly not the elite. No one believed or believes in the judicial system, the economic system, or in the validity of their political decisions. Nervousness began to sink deeper into Civil Society. The moderate left at home and abroad no longer seem to care, simply suggesting that the government has made its own bed and must sleep in it alone.
This crisis of confidence is a very serious issue not just for Lavalas but for the whole country at large. How it is resolved may determine the future of Haiti as a country where law and order as a system of government, is finally stronger than the mere will of individual politicians or interest groups.
Fortunately there is the issue of municipal and parliamentary elections that are supposed to come up. But already, the political atmosphere is poisoned not because of the demonstrations, for and against government that have begun since November 17, 2002. Instead, it is because of the context in which those demonstrations are taking place.
The opposition is demonstrating for a typical solution à l'haïtienne, as they say, called "rache manyók", a Haitian term that suggests the removal of the president and the entire political apparatus under his command. This is or probably would be the wrong solution.
First of all, the president was elected by a majority of voters who went to the voting booth. The opposition abstained to participate in these elections because by and large, they knew that they would not win.
Secondly, reshuffling the cards as they call it, would create perhaps a period of confusion in the country in which more people would die, some innocently, adding more resentments in the heart of losers who would just keep quite, waiting in the wings for when they once again had the opportunity to take revenge.
Third is the issue of the process itself. If elections take place in 2003 as scheduled, Lavalas will probably lose. One group may not have a clear majority in Parliament. Nevertheless, the opposition groups could form a coalition government with their Prime Minister who would be the real and effective president. At that point, Aristide himself would be just a figure head. As he has been accused time and again of being a crook, the opposition government would have greater access to government former expenses, and find out how or where monies went. They would thus be able to build a credible case against him, perhaps before but definitely after he finishes his term. The process in itself would be orderly and quite promising.
On the other hand, if they successfully overthrow him, there would be a need for much greater international involvement to assure law and order throughout the country, which would cost the foreign community millions and perhaps billions. The battle between and among opposition groups would be perhaps even bloody, as different entities in the opposition would claim that it is thanks to their work that Aristide was overthrown and that therefore, they should have their man, or woman, as the new leader, the new president. Haiti would thus be further destabilized and the confidence level would not be restored.
Options for Aristide
Whether he believes it or not, Aristide still has some decent options. The president himself would have to agree that his first year since returning to power has been a disaster. He would need the courage to revamp his government, probably starting with the Prime Minister himself. He would have to choose among willing foes to integrate his government. He would have to control his base to ensure sure that Main Street (i.e. Boulevard Jean-Jacques Dessalines in Haiti) does function unencumbered by eternal demonstrators. He would also have to take a hands-off approach to economic affairs, something that he clearly does not seem to fully comprehend.
Earlier this year, following the rice scandal, some of his still hopeful partisans did suggest that he choose such a Prime Minister who has better administrative experiences and talent, even if such Prime Minister would not have come from directly from the leadership of his political party. Instead, he chose someone with no administrative experience in public affairs, at home or abroad, Yvon Neptune, but who like himself has plenty of political experience. He refused to admit that the problem is managerial and administrative, and not political first. The situation has since then worsened and he probably has not changed much from last time.
The total control approach that he has been accused of would have to be modified if not neutralized, for his own good. He needs to learn to trust for the better, those running government, allow them to do what is correct while he focuses on what he knows best, politics. He would also need advisers who do not tell him what they know he wants to hear, but what the reality is.
Finally, he would also need to begin the process of reorganizing his political party, and encourage people on the moderate left who are prepared and willing to join his ranks and able to positively contribute, to join ranks. So far as it seems, most of those who were with him from the start but were not interested in power per se, have become silent and left his party because of what they call his refusal to listen to those who disagree with his approach.
In any case, Aristide might as well learn to work with a government that does not include people who are committed to him first. After all, the way things are going now and if he does survive and takes his party to elections in the summer of 2003, he will have to deal with a disillusioned electorate as he will register massive electoral loss. Then he would have to learn to deal with a hostile Prime Minister and a hostile government.
This period between now and 2003 is a great time for him to start experiencing divided government before he gets to be truly completely isolated inside the National Palace. In fact, perhaps by accepting the idea of divided government, and by bringing in non Lavalas people into his government, he would not only bring in some ray of hope but perhaps even have his political party succeed in the 2003 elections if things got better that way.
Based on Aristide's public political character however, this whole idea may be far-fetched. If so, he may be in much more serious trouble that he thinks he is in. The demonstrations-only strategy, without fundamental changes in the structures of his government, may simply backfire and show that he is nothing but a vile populist as his enemies contend.
What has happened to the disillusioned left?
The left in this whole ordeal seems to have become divided, fractionalized, dismayed, but as a whole ineffective to represent an alternative strategy.
On the one hand, you have the so-called turncoats who have joined ranks with hard-line right-wingers in the Convergence. They are some of the most vociferous anti-Aristide mouths. You also have those who have not joined the Convergence, overtly criticize that opposition groups, but yet behave the same way or at least express the same language like the Convergence.
Finally, you have a group of silent but thoughtful individuals from the left who wish that things had not turned out that way. They wished that Aristide had listened to those who voiced reason rather than expediency. They wished that he had focused on administrative issues, rather than devoting all his time and the State's resources to political ones. In any case they wish, even if the reality of the day or moment forced him to focus on politics, that he would hire administrators to do administrative work and trust them, rather than always trying to mingle into technical and administrative issues for which he clearly is not qualified.
In case Aristide does not listen to the voice of reasons and try to rejoin the moderates who still wish him success, they should reorganize and truly begin the process of building a party that is focused on the issues in a way that is concordant with their basic ideology. They have plenty of issues indeed that they can capitalize on: social safety net in the necessity of a strong market economy; education, justice for all and not for groups, the issue of modernizing government, the political process, etc. The left should not be amorphous unless willing to stay behind for perhaps at least a decade.
In this new reality where contention has been the mere strength of Haiti's political system, no one is sure of what may happen. There are still a few certainties. Aristide is no longer as popular as he used to be, whatever his hawkish advisers may tell him. Haiti is at a very difficult corner where the debate on law and order is once again put in the back burner to the benefit of power-grabbing traditional politicians. The political configuration has changed profoundly over the past year. Times are and will continue to be hard in and for Haiti for a long time to come, at least as it seems.
Still there is hope. The hope can only become reality if the politicians use their head, and manage this crisis with reason, rather than based on their biases for or against Aristide.
